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SUMMARY 
In 2006, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) adopted a new 
national reform agenda and established the COAG Reform Council, 
developments which were later used as a foundation for the first Rudd 
Government’s reforms to intergovernmental relations in Australia.  These 
reforms used COAG as their focus and established a revised federal financial 
relations scheme and a broader reform agenda.  They also gave the COAG 
Reform Council an expanded role in measuring the progress of reform across 
all jurisdictions and reporting its findings to COAG. 
The apparatus of COAG and intergovernmental relations now encompasses an 
extensive system of COAG Councils and other fora, as well as less visible 
forms of collaboration, which take place between the agencies and officers of all 
levels of government.  This structure is largely focussed on developing and 
implementing the COAG reform agenda, which covers a wide range of policy 
fields, including education, skills and training, health, housing and 
homelessness, the environment and regulatory reform.  This policy agenda is 
underpinned by the revised financial framework that is embodied in the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations. 
The reforms to COAG and its processes instituted by the first Rudd Government 
have changed the character of COAG, arguably transforming it from a leaders’ 
summit to a central institution of government.  This new significance of COAG 
has given rise to renewed concerns relating to the lack of permanency, 
transparency and accountability in intergovernmental relations.   
This paper provides an overview of the operation of COAG, and other aspects 
of intergovernmental relations in Australia.  A two-part approach has been 
taken.  Part One provides a ‘bare bones’ overview of the framework of COAG 
and its reform agenda.  Its aim is to provide a kind of ‘mud map’ to enable 
relatively easy navigation of the labyrinthine structure of COAG, its associated 
Councils and its current reform agenda.  Much of the information contained in 
the first part is taken from COAG-related websites.  In an attempt to make this 
map clear, commentary and critique has been left to Part Two of the paper, to 
the extent that this is possible.   
COAG is something of an atypical body or institution, neither constitutional nor 
statutory in origin or nature.  It is more amorphous, an administrative creation of 
executive will, resistant to neat description or characterisation.  It is something 
of a moveable feast, constantly changing and adapting to political and other 
circumstances.  Any description of it can therefore only hope to capture its 
working at a particular point in time.  It is this task that Part One of this paper 
has set itself, relying solely on publicly available material.   
Part Two provides an overview of some of the current evaluations of COAG, in 
light of its apparent transformation, and also some of the suggestions for reform 
that have been put forward.  Part Two does not attempt to cover all of the 
relevant issues that are identified in the literature about federalism and 
intergovernmental relations.  Its aim is rather to canvass some of these issues 
 in a broad way while focussing primarily on COAG.  Discussed in Part Two are 
the following issues with COAG and the practice of intergovernmental relations 
in Australia: 
 Lack of transparency in intergovernmental relations; 
 
 Accountability – COAG, intergovernmental relations and Parliaments; 
 
 Commonwealth’s dominance of COAG; 
 
 Lack of institutional structures and systems; and 
 
 COAG & the consequences of intergovernmental relations. 
Many of the problems associated with intergovernmental relations in Australia 
can be traced back to the features of Australia’s federal structure, which 
continues to influence and shape the ways in which governments transact their 
affairs.  The continuing relevance of the issues discussed in Part Two of this 
paper suggest the need for considered evaluation of Australian federalism in the 
twenty-first century, what it is, what it does, what it should do and where it is 
going. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent times it seems that there has been a growing acceptance that an ever 
wider range of policy challenges require a nationally coordinated response.  For 
example, much of the discussion of policy that presently takes place in the 
public domain is focussed on big-ticket reforms such as the implementation of 
the National Disability Insurance Scheme (the NDIS or “DisabilityCare”) and the 
Commonwealth Government’s reform of education funding, usually referred to 
as the “Gonski” reform.  The delivery of such national initiatives requires 
intergovernmental cooperation.  As the principal forum for intergovernmental 
relations in Australia, the Council of Australian Governments, or COAG, has 
accordingly attained a new significance.  Some have even suggested that, as a 
consequence of this significance, it has transformed from a mere leaders’ forum 
into a powerful institution of executive government.1  In addition to its far-
reaching reform agenda, it now has a system for the reporting of performance 
on the progress of the implementation of reforms, along with a revised scheme 
for the funding of those reforms.  This transformation has given rise to 
observations regarding the need to make some changes to COAG’s role and 
processes, to better equip it to fulfil the role it has assumed.     
The first Rudd Government attempted to improve the workings of the federation 
by reforming COAG and its processes.  It is arguable, though, that this attempt 
to strengthen COAG to facilitate more effective intergovernmental collaboration 
has been undermined by the complex forces at play within Australia’s federal 
structure.  For example, while cooperation has been achieved across a diverse 
range of fields, the Commonwealth tends to dominate collaborative policy 
efforts, largely, but not only, as a result of its superior fiscal power.  The 
Commonwealth’s dominance of COAG, which extends to its control of when 
and how often COAG meets, as well as meeting agendas, was noted by Barry 
O’Farrell in February 2011, prior to the election of his Government in NSW.  He 
also spoke of an “unconsidered slide towards a coercive centralism”, and 
warned against allowing COAG “to become a fourth arm of government.”2       
Claims that Australia’s federal system is dysfunctional continue to be made.  
The results of the most recent survey of Australian Constitutional Values, 
conducted by Newspoll for Griffith University (Centre for Governance & Public 
Policy, and Griffith Law School) and the University of New South Wales (Gilbert 
+ Tobin Centre of Public Law) suggest that there has been an increase in public 
dissatisfaction with the federal system.  The survey found that 66% of 
respondents “do not believe that federal and state governments are working 
well together”. 3  Further, it was found that “[s]ince 2008 there has been an 8% 
                                            
1
  P McClintock, “Renewing the mandate: COAG and its reform agenda in 2011”, Speech to 
the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia (Sydney, 9 February 2011). 
2
  NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, Key Issues and Regional Profiles for the 
55
th
 Parliament, Background Paper No 2/2011, 8. 
3
  A J Brown, “Political investment needed in federal reform: National survey results”, Griffith 
University media release (17 October 2012), Australian Constitutional Vales Survey, 
NSW Parliamentary Research Service 
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fall in confidence in intergovernmental collaboration, and a similar 8% rise in 
those believing the federal system as a whole is not working overall”; the survey 
also recorded “a huge 21% fall in confidence in the federal level of government 
as the most effective at its job.” 4   
Reform of the federation is once again on the agenda in the current federal 
election campaign.  In his budget reply speech, Tony Abbott said that “the 
blame game between the Commonwealth and the states that Kevin Rudd 
promised to end has become worse than ever.”  He pledged: 
Within two years of a change of government, working with the states, the 
coalition will produce a white paper on COAG reform, and the responsibilities of 
different governments, to ensure that, as far as possible, the states are sovereign 
in their own sphere. 
The objective will be to reduce and end, as far as possible, the waste, duplication 
and second-guessing between different levels of government that has resulted, 
for instance, in the Commonwealth employing 6,000 health bureaucrats even 
though it does not run a single hospital. 5 
This paper provides an overview of the operation of COAG, and other aspects 
of intergovernmental relations in Australia.  A two-part approach has been 
taken.  Part One provides a ‘bare bones’ overview of the framework of COAG 
and its reform agenda.  Its aim is to provide a kind of ‘mud map’ to enable 
relatively easy navigation of the labyrinthine structure of COAG, its associated 
Councils and its current reform agenda.  Much of the information contained in 
the first part is taken from COAG-related websites.  In an attempt to make this 
map clear, commentary and critique has been left to Part Two of the paper, to 
the extent that this is possible.   
COAG is something of an atypical body or institution, neither constitutional nor 
statutory in origin or nature.  It is more amorphous, an administrative creation of 
executive will, resistant to neat description or characterisation.  It is something 
of a moveable feast, constantly changing and adapting to political and other 
circumstances.  Any description of it can therefore only hope to capture its 
working at a particular point in time.  It is this task that Part One of this paper 
has set itself, relying solely on publicly available material.   
Part Two provides an overview of some of the current evaluations of COAG, in 
light of its apparent transformation, and also some of the suggestions for reform 
that have been put forward.  Part Two does not attempt to cover all of the 
relevant issues that are identified in the literature about federalism and 
intergovernmental relations.  Its aim is rather to canvass some of these issues 
in a broad way while focussing primarily on COAG.   
                                                                                                                                
Results Release 1, (17 November 2012). 
4
  Ibid. 
5
  T Abbott, Parliament of Australia, House of Representatives, Hansard (16 May 2013) 88-
93, 92. 
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PART ONE – THE FRAMEWORK 
2. COAG 
COAG was set up in 1992 to facilitate cooperation between the Commonwealth 
and State and Territory Governments on issues of national importance.  It grew 
out of the Special Premiers’ Conferences, which had been initiated by the 
Hawke Government, following recognition that there was a need for “a new 
initiative in intergovernmental relations.”6  The first meeting of COAG was held 
in Perth on 7 December 1992.  
In the intervening two decades, the importance of COAG has waxed and 
waned.7  In recent years, however, COAG has assumed a new significance in 
the landscape of intergovernmental relations in Australia.8  In the lead up to the 
2007 election, Kevin Rudd’s campaign platform had included a commitment to 
renewed cooperation between the Commonwealth and the States and 
Territories.9  In power, Rudd declared his intention to make COAG the 
“workhorse of the nation”.10  Almost immediately11, he set about reforming the 
framework of intergovernmental relations in Australia, with the aim of increasing 
collaboration between Commonwealth and State Governments in the delivery of 
nationally significant reform, using COAG as the “vehicle” for this new 
approach.12  These developments occurred at a time when Mr Rudd’s party was 
also in government in every State and Territory.     
McQuestin summarises the focus of the first Rudd Government’s reforms as 
follows: 
Rudd’s reforms targeted the main apparatus of intergovernmental relations by 
focusing on three broad areas: 
 a new flexible and accountable financial framework for Commonwealth-state 
transfers;  
 procedural modifications to COAG and its decision-making structures; and 
                                            
6
  M Painter, Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reform in Australia in the 1990s (1998), 
36. 
7
  P Kildea and A Lynch, “Entrenching ‘cooperative federalism’: Is it time to formalise COAG’s 
place in the Australian Federation?” (2011) 39(1) Federal Law Review 103-129, 103. 
8
  This is acknowledged by the “COAG’s National Reform Agenda” webpage on the COAG 
website, which states that “[s]ince December 2007, COAG has grown and has taken on an 
important new role.” 
9
  G Anderson, “Whither the Federation? Federalism under Rudd”, (2010) 5(1) Public Policy, 
1-22  
10
  P Karvelas, “Rudd harnesses COAG ‘workhorse’”, The Australian (21 December 2007), 1.  
11
  A meeting of COAG was held on 20 December 2007 (see communiqué). 
12
  A Fenna and G Anderson, "The Rudd reforms and the future of Australian federalism" in G 
Appleby, N Aroney and T John (eds) The Future of Australian Federalism: Comparative 
and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2012) 393-413, 397. 
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 expansion of the role and function of the COAG Reform Council to provide 
transparency through reporting. 
The first was to place financial transfers on a more sustainable footing, the 
second was to facilitate progress and the third was to support the implementation 
of the broad ranging, and comprehensive sectoral reform agenda.13  
COAG is now situated at the centre of an ambitious national reform agenda.  It 
is also the apex of a vast structure dedicated to facilitating intergovernmental 
collaboration.  It is a forum where the leaders of Commonwealth, State and 
Territory Governments meet and agree, or disagree, on the nationwide 
implementation of reforms in a sweeping range of policy areas, from 
competition policy and initiatives aimed at reducing red tape, to social policy in 
areas like health, education and disability reform, as well as policies relating to 
matters such as organised crime.  Where consensus is reached at COAG, it is 
usually reflected in an intergovernmental agreement, which is a document 
setting out the terms of the agreement, the implementation of which is often the 
responsibility of more than one level of government.  Progress on the 
implementation of these reforms is tracked against identified indicators by the 
COAG Reform Council, which reports periodically to COAG.      
The leviathan nature of COAG’s reform agenda has attracted criticism centred 
around whether or not it is possible for COAG to deliver on its many 
commitments; there is debate, too, about the way this agenda facilitates the 
Commonwealth’s encroachment on fields of responsibility that were formerly the 
sole preserve of the States.  The scope of COAG’s agenda is problematic from 
other perspectives.  For example, on one analysis, COAG’s status as a final 
decision making body in relation to such a broad array of policy matters means 
that it no longer functions as simply a leaders’ forum, resembling instead a 
powerful institution of executive government.14  As the former Chairman of the 
COAG Reform Council, Paul McClintock, said in a 2011 address: 
The role of COAG has changed profoundly over the past two decades. When I 
observed it closely in the early 2000s it was an occasional summit meeting of 
domestic political leadership. There has, of course, been the perennial issue of 
Commonwealth-State funding agreements, but the complexity of these has 
increased over time. From the early 1990s there was the focus on competition 
reforms, including early steps on water and energy reform. By 2006, however, 
the COAG reform agenda had expanded considerably, culminating in the then 
National Reform Agenda. 
The Rudd government took this to a new level, and decided that COAG would 
take on the paramount leadership role in the federation, including detailed 
                                            
13
  M McQuestin “Federalism under the Rudd and Gillard Governments” in P Kildea, A Lynch 
and G Williams (eds) Tomorrow’s Federation (2012) 6-25, 12. 
14
  McClintock, above n 1, 1.  See also P Kildea, “Making Room for Democracy in 
Intergovernmental Relations” in P Kildea, A Lynch and G Williams (eds), Tomorrow’s 
Federation (2012) 73-91, 74, P O’Meara and A Faithfull, “Increasing Accountability at the 
Heart of the Federation” in P Kildea, A Lynch and G Williams (eds), Tomorrow’s Federation 
(2012), 92-112, 92. 
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oversight of the implementation of federally agreed programs. An ambitious 
forward program of reform – the COAG reform agenda - was developed. The 
high point of this process was the Intergovernmental Agreement of Federal 
Financial Relations, or IGA, which from January 2009 changed the way the 
financial affairs of the commonwealth and states were conducted.15    
O’Meara and Faithfull have also observed: 
COAG has evolved to become a body that negotiates major policy reform, 
oversees intergovernmental bodies and arrangements that implement such 
reform, and develops and agrees to strategic, intergovernmental responses to 
key issues impacting the nation.16  
In comparing COAG to Cabinet, they further stated: 
Whereas Cabinet brings together Ministers of a sovereign government under the 
leadership of a first minister, COAG brings together first ministers of the 
Australian federation – leaders of sovereign governments with their own 
philosophies, political affiliations, mandates and priorities, in addition to a 
representative of local government.  It also brings together in the same forum 
access to all of the levers – funding, legislation, regulation and service delivery – 
across all policy domains, spanning Commonwealth, state and local government 
responsibilities.  In many cases, this can mean COAG is better placed to pursue 
more substantial and effective reform than that initiated by Commonwealth or 
state Cabinets.  This unique breadth of influence not only illustrates the great 
untapped potential that COAG holds but also affirms its role as the institutional 
heart of the federation.17 
However, COAG remains a largely informal body that is not governed by 
legislation and has no real legal status.  Its ostensible growth in power and 
reach, in the absence of an attendant progression in its governance 
arrangements, has given rise to a number of concerns amongst some 
commentators regarding efficiency, transparency and accountability-related 
issues.  These concerns are outlined in Part Two of this paper.       
The COAG website is a rich source of information about COAG and what it 
does.  Much of the information in Part One of this paper has been taken from 
this and related websites.  Links have been provided where relevant.  
a. Members 
The members of COAG are the Prime Minister, the first ministers (ie the 
Premiers and Chief Ministers) of each State and Territory and the President of 
the Australian Local Government Association.    
Between December 2007 and April 2009, the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory Treasurers also attended COAG meetings.  Treasurers now attend 
                                            
15
  Ibid (McClintock), 2. 
16
  O’Meara and Faithfull, above n 14, 94-95. 
17
  Ibid, 95. 
NSW Parliamentary Research Service 
 
6 
meetings of the Standing Council on Federal Financial Relations instead.  
Further information regarding this and other COAG Councils is provided below 
at section 4 of this paper. 
b. Meetings  
There are no requirements as to where and how often COAG is to meet.  The 
timing and frequency of meetings appears to be a matter largely determined by 
the Prime Minister, “after seeking the views of other first ministers.”18   
Under the first Prime Ministership of Kevin Rudd COAG had met nine times by 
the end of his second year in office.19  By comparison, COAG met twice during 
the first two years of John Howard’s Prime Ministership and fourteen times in 
total during the 11 years of his Government.20  It also met only once in 2010, 
twice in 2011 and three times in 2012.  Its most recent meeting took place on 19 
April 2013.  
Meetings are frequently held in Canberra, but they can be held in State and 
Territory capitals from time to time.  During the time that Kevin Rudd was the 
Prime Minister, for example, meetings were held in Melbourne, Sydney, 
Adelaide, Perth, Hobart and Brisbane. 
c. Meeting agendas 
According to the “Protocols for Council of Australian Governments and Senior 
Officials Meetings”, which is annexed to the 2011 report of the Senate Select 
Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation: 
A draft agenda for COAG meetings will be prepared by the Commonwealth and 
circulated to other COAG members at the Officials-level as soon as possible.  
The Commonwealth will seek to consult with jurisdictions in the preparation of the 
COAG agenda early in its development. 
The draft agenda may also be considered at the final Senior Officials 
meeting/videoconference prior to the COAG meeting.21 
The “Protocols” document further indicates that other jurisdictions and the 
Australian Local Government Association “will have the opportunity to propose 
items for both COAG and Senior Officials meetings” and sets out criteria for 
determining whether an issue should be included on the agenda, as well as a 
structure for the agenda.22  However, it seems that the agenda for a given 
                                            
18
  Ibid, 96. 
19
  Fenna and Anderson, above n 12, 397. 
20
  Ibid. 
21
  Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Protocols for Council of Australian 
Governments and Senior Officials Meetings”, appendix 3, Senate Select Committee on the 
Reform of the Australian Federation, Report: Australia’s Federation: an agenda for reform 
(June 2011), 137. 
22
  Ibid, 137-8. 
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meeting of COAG is usually ultimately determined by the Commonwealth.23    
d. COAG communiqués  
Following a meeting of COAG, a communiqué containing the public record of 
the meeting is released.  These communiqués do not reflect the entire record of 
meetings, in the way that minutes might, for example.  Rather, they contain a 
series of high-level statements outlining the outcomes of the meeting, and 
resemble media releases to a certain extent.  They can therefore seem 
somewhat opaque to readers who might be attempting to gain a deeper 
understanding of what may have transpired at COAG in relation to a particular 
policy issue.  Agenda papers and other documents prepared for consideration 
by COAG are not routinely made public. 
According to the “Protocols for Council of Australian Governments and Senior 
Officials Meetings”, referred to above: 
The preparation of the communiqué, to be released at the conclusion of a COAG 
meeting, is a joint activity between all COAG members.  COAG meeting 
communiqués will be as short as practicable, compelling and written in action-
oriented plain English that will resonate with the Australian community.  Matters 
of detail may be better addressed through the record of the meeting.  
The Protocols document further states that communiqués are prepared in 
advance of the meeting, so COAG is able to agree their public release at the 
meeting: 
A draft communiqué will be prepared by [the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet] and provided to the States and Territories and [Australian Association of 
Local Governments] as soon as possible in the lead-up to the COAG meeting.  A 
communiqué drafting session to which representatives of all COAG members are 
invited may be organised by [the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet] in 
the week leading up to the COAG meeting. 
The Protocols document further indicates that there will be a communiqué 
drafting session held the day before a COAG meeting, and at the conclusion of 
a COAG meeting “representatives of all COAG members are to clear the 
communiqué before it is released publicly” by the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet.24  Communiqués for all meetings that took place between 
December 2007 and December 2012 are available here on the COAG website.  
Outcomes of earlier COAG and Special Premiers’ Conference (the predecessor 
of COAG) meetings are available here.   
The Protocols document also provides guidance for the preparation of records 
of COAG meetings, which presumably reflect what took place at COAG in 
greater detail than communiqués.  Once finalised, these are circulated to 
                                            
23
  O’Meara and Faithfull, above n 14, 96; Kildea and Lynch, above n 7, 113. 
24
  Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation, above n 21, 139. 
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“COAG members” but are not posted on the COAG website.25   
3. THE COUNCIL FOR THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION (CAF) 
The Council for the Australian Federation, or CAF, is an additional forum for 
intergovernmental relations, set up by State and Territory first ministers in 
2006.26  It is distinguished from COAG in that the Commonwealth does not 
participate in it.  Menzies writes that CAF was “established as a counterbalance 
to the centralising power of the federal government and to improve the 
operation of the federation.”27 
The CAF Secretariat is currently located in Melbourne.  Unlike the COAG 
Secretariat, which is located within the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, the CAF Secretariat is funded by all States and Territories and rotates 
between jurisdictions.28 
CAF has played a role in national reform as an additional setting for developing 
policy, including policy on “climate change, improving the federation and 
national regulatory reform.”29  According to Jennifer Menzies, it has also 
performed the function of supporting COAG by providing a forum within which 
the ground could be prepared for COAG’s big-ticket reforms.30  Menzies writes 
that “to a large extent, it was the institutional support from CAF which made the 
vast Rudd agenda workable.”  She explains: 
Before each COAG meeting state and territory first ministers and senior officials 
embarked on a number of teleconferences.  The pattern was for the senior 
officials to initiate discussions and then the first ministers would talk to refine their 
position or to identify differences.  As a senior official said, these meetings 
‘provided the fora in which state leaders discussed, debated, developed and 
understood the position of each jurisdiction’.”31  
Menzies notes, for example, that during the health reform negotiations of 2009-
10, CAF “played an important role in identifying common ground” between the 
sub-national jurisdictions.32  Menzies further explains how CAF was able to aid 
the COAG process: 
The pre-COAG CAF processes meant most of the groundwork around complex 
negotiations was undertaken before the meeting.  This freed up the Prime 
                                            
25
  Ibid, 140. 
26
  CAF website.  For an account of the formation and role of CAF, see J Menzies, “The 
Council for the Australian Federation and the Ties that Bind” in P Kildea, A Lynch and G 
Williams (eds) Tomorrow’s Federation (2012), 53-72. 
27
  J Menzies, “The Council for the Australian Federation and the Ties that Bind” in P Kildea, A 
Lynch and G Williams (eds) Tomorrow’s Federation (2012), 53-72, 64. 
28
  Contacts webpage, CAF website. 
29
  Menzies, above n 27, 61.  
30
  Ibid, 65. 
31
  Ibid. 
32
  Ibid. 
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Minister and first ministers at the COAG meeting to focus their energies on 
matters of difference.  The work that CAF had done beforehand supported this 
decision-making by presenting the Prime Minister with one bargaining position 
from the states.  It reduced the need for multilateral negotiations across a range 
of complex issues and allowed for progress to be made on such a large 
agenda;33        
However, Menzies goes on to comment that that the “cooperative federalism 
agenda of the Rudd government diminished CAF’s role to one of brokering 
agreements before COAG”, and that the volume of work involved “subsumed 
the policy capacity of the states and territories into the COAG agenda”.  For 
Menzies, this led to a “loss of CAF’s capacity to undertake independent policy 
work.”34  She observes: 
The challenge for CAF is to find its feet amongst the changing cycles of 
federalism.  The organisation had a strong and clear imperative with respect to 
the more coercive policies of the Howard government but then struggled to define 
its role in a more cooperative phase.35      
Despite this, CAF continues to meet, usually just prior to COAG.  The most 
recent meeting of CAF was held on 15 April 2013.  Past meeting dates, and 
information regarding outcomes of some, although not all, meetings, are 
available here. 
Further information about CAF is available on its website.  Information about 
CAF’s policy work is available on the ‘Policy Innovation’ webpage.  The website 
also provides access to a range of publications, including the papers in CAF’s 
Federalist Paper series, which it established to “create debate.”36  There are 
four papers in this series, published between 2007 and 2011 (see this webpage; 
links to each paper are provided below): 
 Federalist Paper 1: Australia's Federal Future  
 
 Federalist Paper 2: The Future of Schooling in Australia 
 
 Federalist Paper 3: Common Cause: Strengthening Cooperative Federalism  
 
 Federalist Paper 4: Report on Intergovernmental Institutions 
4. COAG COUNCILS & OTHER MODES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS  
COAG is supported in the implementation of its reform agenda by a number of 
other entities.  These include Standing Councils, Select Councils, Legislative 
                                            
33
  Ibid. 
34
  Ibid, 70. 
35
  Ibid. 
36
  Ibid, 63. 
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and Governance Fora and a “vast supporting bureaucracy.”37   
COAG Standing Councils, Select Councils and Legislative and Governance 
Fora now fulfil the role of what used to be called Ministerial Councils.  These 
Councils provide forums for the relevant Ministers from the Commonwealth, 
States, Territories, and sometimes New Zealand, to meet and pursue reforms 
within the jurisdiction of the particular Council.  The work of each Council is 
overseen by COAG. 
The COAG Council Handbook: A Guide for the Best-Practice Operations for 
COAG Council Secretariats (COAG Council Handbook) describes the role of 
these Councils as follows: 
COAG uses Councils as vehicles for driving its reform agenda and co-operative 
federalism.  Councils develop and coordinate policy, problem-solve and provide a 
ministerial forum for joint action by jurisdictions within the Federation. 
Only significant intergovernmental reform work should be progressed through the 
Council System, with all other work delegated to Senior Officials level.38  
a. Reform of the former Ministerial Council system 
Briefing Paper 10/09 outlines the role played by the former Ministerial Councils 
(or 'Mincos') in supporting COAG.39  There were formerly more than 40 
Ministerial Councils and other "ministerial fora" (councils with ministerial 
representatives from only a select number of jurisdictions, rather than all 
jurisdictions).40 
By 2009, concerns were expressed about the speed of progress being made on 
COAG’s reform agenda.  There were calls from some quarters for the 
rationalisation of not only the agenda, but also the number of Ministerial 
Councils, which, according to the former Victorian Premier Steve Bracks, 
operated as “blocks to reform.”41  As noted in Briefing Paper 10/09, at its 
meeting on 2 July 2009, COAG resolved to appoint Dr Allan Hawke to lead a 
review of the system of Ministerial Councils "to ensure the ongoing 
effectiveness of these arrangements."42  Dr Hawke's report has not been 
publicly released, but his findings were considered by COAG at its 19-20 April 
2010 meeting.  The Communiqué for this meeting indicates that, after 
consideration of the review’s findings, "COAG has accepted the need to effect 
                                            
37
  P Kildea, above n 14, 75. 
38
  The COAG Council Handbook: A Guide for the Best-Practice Operations for COAG Council 
Secretariats, p 5. 
39
  G Griffith, Managerial Federalism – COAG and the States, NSW Parliamentary Library 
Research Service, Briefing Paper 10/09, 9-12.  
40
  Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation, above n 21, 43. 
41
  A Hepworth and M Ludlow, “Call for new federal-state reform pact”, Australian Financial 
Review 1 September 2009, 1. 
42
  COAG Communiqué, 2 July 2009. 
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fundamental reform to the Ministerial Council system by March 2011."43  
b. New Council system 
The Communiqué for the April 2010 meeting of COAG indicated that it had 
agreed in principle to a rationalisation of the Ministerial Councils to eleven or 
fewer councils.  These Councils would oversee "key areas of ongoing 
importance to both the Commonwealth and the States, including health, 
education and training, community services, infrastructure, police and 
emergency services and financial relations."  Finally, the Communiqué stated 
that "COAG will also convene from time to time Select Councils of Ministers 
when it requires advice on particular matters within specific timeframes." 
At its meeting on 13 February 2011, COAG agreed to a "comprehensive reform 
plan for a new system of Ministerial Councils."44  The Communiqué from the 13 
February meeting states:  
These changes will see a fundamental shift towards a council system focussed 
on strategic national priorities and new ways for COAG and its councils to identify 
and address issues of national significance. 
COAG has effectively halved the number of Ministerial councils from over 40 to 
23. This will see COAG focus on reforms of critical national importance through: 
 a more agile and responsive system based on policy development through 
Standing Councils and flexibility to respond to critical and complex issues 
through time-limited subject-matter specific Select Councils; 
 policy oversight of National Agreements and National Partnership 
Agreements; 
 a system more focussed on implementation; and 
 a tighter relationship between COAG and its Councils.45 
The diagram on the next page shows the structure of the new system of COAG 
Councils.  It is adapted from the diagram included in 'Attachment C' to the 
Communiqué for the 13 February 2011 meeting of COAG.  The diagram 
therefore represents the structure of the COAG Council System at the time of its 
reform.  Note that not all Select Councils listed within it are currently in 
operation.  A new Standing Council, dedicated to Disability Reform, has also 
been established.46    Further details regarding the current status of Councils 
and Working Groups, are provided below, where possible.  
  
                                            
43
  COAG Communiqué, 19-20 April 2010. 
44
  COAG Communiqué, 13 February 2011. 
45
  COAG Communiqué, 13 February 2011. 
46
  See COAG Communiqué, 7 December 2012. 
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'Attachment C' to the Communiqué for the meeting of 13 February 2011 
explained that Standing Councils, which, as their name suggests are ongoing in 
nature, would address “enduring issues of national significance” while Select 
Councils, which would be established for limited time periods, would address 
“critical and complex issues”.  The Ministerial and Legislative Governance Fora 
were established to “manage ongoing legislative and governance functions” that 
are outside the scope of the Standing Councils.   
Attachment C said of the new Council system that: 
This new system provides a clear role for Ministers from all jurisdictions to 
support COAG in tackling 21st century policy challenges. There will be sustained 
collaborative effort on the long-term reform agenda while allowing for the 
flexibility needed to address more urgent challenges. 
The new arrangements strengthen policy oversight of National Agreements and 
National Partnership Agreements, which govern the financial relationships 
between the Commonwealth and States and Territories and ensure performance 
and delivery. There will also be greater emphasis on implementation and a tighter 
relationship between COAG and its Councils. 
As the diagram on the previous page suggests, each Council seems to be 
ultimately answerable to COAG.   
The COAG Council Handbook, issued following the reform of the Council 
structure is a useful source of information about the role and administration of 
each type of Council.   It states that COAG must agree to the terms of reference 
for each Council, which determines the scope of a Council’s work.  Councils 
must also provide an annual report to COAG outlining their actions and 
decisions.47  Appendix 4 to the Handbook sets out the timeframes by which 
Councils must produce these reports; it further requires Councils to release 
communiqués within one week of the conclusion of their meetings.48 
According to the Handbook, Councils must also undertake reviews, at three 
year intervals, of: their structures (including secretariat arrangements); number 
of meetings; costs; implementation of decisions; objectives and performance; 
relations with other COAG and other Councils and also areas of possible 
overlap; and sub-committees and working parties, to ensure that they only exist 
where they are essential.49     
The Handbook contains further guidance about Councils generally, for example, 
regarding their membership and meetings.  It states that, while Councils will 
generally be comprised of representatives from each Australian jurisdiction, 
they may also require the attendance of representatives from the Australian 
Local Government Association and New Zealand (with the exception of the 
Standing Council on Federal Financial Relations, and also the Fora, where 
                                            
47
  The COAG Council Handbook, above n 38, 5. 
48
  Ibid. 
49
  Ibid, 5-6. 
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membership is determined by the relevant governing instrument).50  
The question of when and how often it will meet is left to the discretion of each 
Council.51  The Handbook states: 
In making decisions about frequency of meetings, Councils should prioritise the 
achievement of COAG tasks over other work undertaken by the Council, and 
consider how often they must meet to achieve their priorities and responsibilities.   
Councils are also to determine whether their members need to have face to 
face meetings or whether they can meet via COAG’s secure TelePresence 
network, which enables video conferencing.52  Appendix 3 to the COAG Council 
Handbook contains further information about the TelePresence facility.53   
On the subject of Council operations, the Handbook specifies: 
Councils should establish effective operational arrangements to ensure they 
achieve their priorities and responsibilities. Councils will generally be supported 
by a Senior Officials Group and may set up other sub-groups.54  
The Handbook also stipulates, in relation to the Ministers that are members of 
Councils that they: 
. . . must ensure they are in a position to represent their governments at meetings 
and to ensure that objectives are met and implementation is followed through.  
This is of particular importance where resolutions require commitment, especially 
financial commitment from respective governments.55 
The following pages provide some further, more detailed, information specific to 
each type of COAG Council.  Most of the information below is taken directly 
from the COAG Council Handbook.  Links, where available, are also provided to 
the website of each Council or Forum. 
c. Standing Councils 
i) Role and administration of Standing Councils 
The COAG Council Handbook states that the purpose of Standing Councils is 
to: 
 achieve COAG's strategic themes by pursuing and monitoring priority issues 
of national significance which require sustained, collaborative effort; and 
                                            
50
  Ibid, 6. 
51
  Ibid. 
52
  Ibid. 
53
  Ibid, 24-25. 
54
  Ibid, 8.   
55
  Ibid, 6. 
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 address key areas of shared Commonwealth, State and Territory responsibility 
and/or funding.56 
Pages 10-11 of the Handbook outline the work of Standing Councils as follows: 
Standing Councils will undertake high-level policy reform and reform generally in 
line with one or more of COAG's strategic themes.  They will ensure issues 
relevant to multiple policy areas, such as Indigenous disadvantage, will be 
considered in all work.  Councils will also perform collective responsibilities of 
Ministers, as set out in legislation and intergovernmental agreements. 
According to the Handbook, Standing Councils are to be “tasked by COAG with 
five to seven issues or reforms” to pursue.  Standing Councils are only to be 
responsible for reforms which are of national significance, are consistent with 
COAG’s strategic themes (which are discussed below in the section of this 
paper on the COAG reform agenda), and “warrant oversight by First Ministers”. 
The Handbook stresses that: 
. . . only significant intergovernmental reform work should be progressed through 
the COAG System, with all other work delegated to Senior Officials' level.  All 
work progressed by Standing Councils must meet the criteria of achieving 
COAG's strategic themes and addressing key areas of shared Commonwealth, 
State and Territory responsibility and funding. 
'Attachment C' to the Communiqué for the 13 February 2011 meeting of COAG 
stated that, in addition to progressing reform of national significance consistent 
with COAG’s strategic themes, “Standing Councils will also undertake 
legislative and governance functions relevant to their scope.” 
In terms of the administration of Standing Councils, the Handbook states that 
they should have either a permanent or rotating Chair, to be either determined 
by the Council, or approved by COAG at the time of the establishment of the 
Council. Decisions of Councils are to be made by consensus (except where 
statutory instruments specify other voting rules in relation to certain matters). 
Each Standing Council is to determine its own secretariat arrangements. As 
noted above, Standing Councils must provide certain reports regarding their 
activities to COAG.  The timeframes within which such reports must be provided 
are set out in Appendix 4 to the Handbook.57     
Information about the membership, Terms of Reference, reform priorities and 
meeting and secretariat arrangements of each Council is generally available on 
the Council’s website.  Communiqués for the meetings of each Council are also 
available. 
ii) List of Standing Councils 
The following list of Standing Councils was obtained from this webpage of the 
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  Ibid,10. 
57
  Ibid, 21. 
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COAG website.  The links provided are to the website of each Council, where 
available. 
 Community and Disability Services  
 
 Disability Reform  
 
 Energy and Resources  
 
 Environment and Water  
 
 Federal Financial Relations  
 
 Health  
 
 Law and Justice  
 
 Police and Emergency Management  
 
 Primary Industries 
 
 Regional Australia 
 
 School Education and Early Childhood 
 
 Tertiary Education, Skills and Employment 
 
 Transport and Infrastructure 
d. Select Councils 
i) Role and administration of Select Councils 
Select Councils also play an important role in implementing COAG reforms.  
However, unlike Standing Councils, which have ongoing responsibilities, Select 
Councils are generally given specified time periods within which to complete the 
tasks they are charged with, and therefore only exist for limited periods (which 
can be of varying lengths).    
In relation to Select Councils, 'Attachment C' explained: 
Select Councils will be established, where First Ministers propose, to work on 
specific reform tasks of critical national importance that are of sufficient 
importance to warrant Ministers’ direct attention. 
Pages 11 and 12 of the COAG Council Handbook contain guidance relevant to 
Select Councils.   
The Handbook states that, in addition to the identification of a matter of critical 
national importance that requires “a sustained, collaborative effort” to be 
addressed, the following are also preconditions for the establishment of a Select 
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Council: 
 there is shared Commonwealth, State and Territory responsibility; 
 work is unable to be undertaken by another body, such as a 
taskforce, working group or group of Officials; and 
 a specific time duration within which to achieve its reform tasks. 
The Handbook again provides guidance regarding the establishment, role and 
functions of Select Councils.  It states that, to be set up, they must be proposed 
by a First Minister and agreed to by COAG.  Any First Minister can propose the 
creation of a Council to COAG.  The Handbook suggests that, if a First Minister 
would like to make such a proposal, their Department should advise the 
Commonwealth-State Relations Secretariat, which is based in the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Handbook states that it is intended that the 
overall number of Select Councils will remain small. 
The duration of a Select Council’s existence is to be set by COAG when the 
Council's terms of reference are agreed to.  According to the Handbook, "[i]t is 
expected that Councils may operate for periods ranging from six months to 
several years." Chairing, membership and secretariat arrangements for Select 
Councils are to be determined by COAG on a case by case basis.  Select 
Councils are to report to COAG at least biannually (see Appendix 4 to the 
Handbook, which contains timeframes for reporting which are specific to Select 
Councils).58   
Where available, the websites for Select Councils (see links below) provide 
guidance as to the specific nature of the types of reforms that the Council was 
set up to progress.  The “Disability Reform” or NDIS Select Council, for 
example, was established in response to the 2011 Productivity Commission 
report which recommended the adoption of a National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (see Disability Reform link in list below).  This particular Select Council 
has now come to an end, and a Standing Council has been established in its 
place.59    
ii) List of Select Councils 
Due to their impermanent nature, any list of COAG Select Councils is subject to 
change.  This list of Select Councils was taken from this webpage of the COAG 
website; however, it should be noted that it may no longer accurately reflect the 
current status of these Councils.  For example, the work of some of the 
Councils referred to within it may now have been completed, although there has 
been no decision from COAG as yet as to whether the Councils will be 
disbanded or continue a new phase of work with different terms of reference: 
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 Climate Change  
 Disability Reform (expired on 31 December 2012) 
 Gambling Reform  
 Housing and Homelessness 
 Immigration and Settlement (this Council does not have a website, but 
this is the communiqué for its second meeting on 7 August 2012). 
 Women’s Issues 
 Workplace Relations 
e. Legislative and Governance Fora  
'Attachment C' explained that: 
A small number of Ministerial Legislative and Governance Fora will be 
established in specific areas to manage ongoing legislative and governance 
functions where they are outside the scope of Standing Councils.  Five 
Legislative and Governance Fora will cover the following areas: food regulation; 
gene technology; corporations; consumer affairs; and the Murray-Darling Basin. 
The Ministerial Legislative and Governance Fora will also oversight significant 
collective responsibilities for ministers where they are set out in relevant 
legislation, intergovernmental agreements and treaties that are outside the scope 
of Standing Councils.  
Below is a list of current Legislative and Governance Fora, with links to their 
websites: 
 Consumer Affairs 
 Corporations 
 Food Regulation 
 Gene Technology 
 Murray-Darling Basin 
The COAG Council Handbook contains information about these Fora on page 
12.  It indicates that they have been set up in circumstances where 
"Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministers have significant collective 
responsibilities under governing instruments, such as legislation and 
intergovernmental agreements" and also these responsibilities are outside the 
scope of the Standing Councils. 
The work of each Forum is limited to the performance of "collective Ministerial 
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responsibilities set out in instruments such as intergovernmental agreements 
and legislation." These Fora are not to “develop new policy or reform proposals” 
unless such work would be directly related to the responsibilities that they have 
under the legislation or intergovernmental agreement that is relevant to them. 
f. Working Groups 
The 2011 report of the Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the 
Australian Federation says that the Business Regulation and Competition, 
Infrastructure and Indigenous Reform Working Groups were the only three that 
remained of the original seven established by the Rudd Government in 2007.60  
The report says of the other working groups that: 
The remainder were disbanded when their planning task was completed, and 
responsibility for monitoring the implementation of those plans now falls to the 
COAG Reform Council . . . Of the three operating working groups, the 
Infrastructure working group is expected to be wound up in the next year or two, 
the Business Regulation and Competition Working Group is being reassessed in 
2012 and the Indigenous Reform working group is ongoing.61   
One of the documents made public following the meeting of COAG on 19 April 
2013 was a Response to the [COAG Reform Council] Report on Seamless 
National Economy, which said of this National Partnership (the SNE NP) and 
the Business Regulation and Competition Working Group that: 
COAG notes the completion of the SNE NP at end of December 2012 and that 
the Business Regulation and Competition Working Group (BRCWG) also ceased 
at this time. COAG acknowledges the role the BRCWG has played in overseeing 
the implementation of the SNE NP reforms between 2008 and 2012, and thanks 
past and current members of the BRCWG for their contributions. 
g. Business Advisory Forum 
The first meeting of the Business Advisory Forum to COAG was convened by 
the then Prime Minister on 12 April 2012.  The meeting of the Forum was 
chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by the other members of COAG, as 
well as CEOs and representatives from peak business bodies.62  Further 
information about the forum is available on this webpage.  At its own meeting 
the following day COAG agreed six reform priorities aimed at facilitating growth 
in national productivity.  It agreed the establishment of a cross-jurisdictional 
taskforce to “develop the policy and timetable for this ambitious new reform 
agenda.”  The Taskforce was to be chaired by the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth Department of Finance and Deregulation and to include:       
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. . . a senior Commonwealth Treasury official and Deputy Secretary 
representatives from both First Ministers and Treasury departments in the States 
and Territories, reporting to COAG through First Ministers’ Senior Officials (see 
COAG communiqué, 13 April 2012).  
The communiqué from the meeting of 13 April 2012 further indicated that: 
COAG noted the existing work on future regulation and competition reform, 
undertaken by the Business Regulation and Competition Working Group and the 
Standing Council on Federal Financial Relations, and asked the Taskforce to 
provide advice on the merit of these proposals in the context of a focused 
productivity-enhancing reform agenda. COAG agreed that the Business 
Regulation and Competition Working Group would see the completion of the 
existing Seamless National Economy reforms by the end of 2012 but would not 
continue beyond this, being replaced by the Taskforce.  
A second meeting of the Business Advisory Forum was held on 6 December 
2012 (see Business Advisory Forum communiqué).  At the COAG meeting of 19 
April 2013 (see communiqué), the Taskforce provided this report to COAG.  The 
report states that the six reform priority areas for improving productivity are: 
 national environmental reform;  
 reforms to lift regulatory performance;  
 reforms to reduce red tape, including initiatives to reduce the reporting burden 
on business and specific measures to address the concerns of small business;  
 rationalisation of carbon reduction and energy efficiency schemes;  
 energy market reform; and  
 reforms to improve development assessment processes for low impact 
development and to streamline approvals for major projects.  
The report provides an update on the progress to date on each of these areas 
of reform. 
h. Senior Officials Groups/Advisory Councils & the bureaucracy 
COAG and its Councils are supported by groups comprised of senior public 
service officials (usually the Directors General, Secretaries or Chief Executives 
of the agencies administered by the Minister or Ministers who are members of 
the relevant Council).  Details of these Senior Officials and Advisory Groups can 
be harder to find than information about the COAG Councils that they support.   
A case in point is the group generally called COAG Senior Officials, which 
supports COAG itself.  This internal training document, produced by the 
Queensland Treasury in 2009, summarises the composition and work of the 
COAG Senior Officials Group as follows: 
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 Comprises of Directors-General’s of Premier’s Departments and Chaired 
by Secretary of PM&C. 
 A process body to work through issues and help frame the COAG 
agenda. 
 Is the fine detail to the broad COAG brush.    
The “Protocols for Council of Australian Governments and Senior Officials 
Meetings”, which is annexed to the 2011 report of the Senate Select Committee 
on the Reform of the Australian Federation, states: 
By preference, Senior Officials will, meet on an as needed basis to support 
COAG members in their work.  Where possible, these meetings will be conducted 
via videoconferencing to minimise the imposition on participants.  There will be at 
least one videoconference and/or meeting prior to each COAG meeting. 
If possible, the final Senior Officials meeting/videoconference prior to a COAG 
meeting will be held at least 10 to 12 days before a COAG meeting.  This will 
best assist the briefing process for COAG members.63 
COAG Senior Officials therefore fulfil an important function.  They are, in effect, 
the conduit between COAG and the bureaucracies of each sub-national 
jurisdiction.   
The other Senior Officials and Advisory Groups, including the Heads of 
Treasuries, or “HoTs” group, perform similar functions in relation to their 
corresponding COAG Councils.  Information is available regarding some of 
these groups on the websites of respective Councils (see links above), with the 
amount of detail available varying from one group to another.   
In relation to Officials Groups, the COAG Council Handbook states: 
Senior Officials Groups will generally develop and progress issues for upcoming 
Council meetings. Items of a procedural and technical nature should be 
delegated to officials to determine, or be dealt with out-of-session.64  
It further provides that: 
Officials should develop issues for the consideration of Ministers.  Officials should 
meet a minimum of three weeks prior to Council meetings, to allow proper 
consideration of the issues.  Agenda-setting processes should be commenced 
sufficiently ahead of the proposed Officials meeting to ensure that final agenda 
and papers are circulated in a timely manner.65   
It should be acknowledged that agency officials of various ranks across all 
jurisdictions undertake significant work, including negotiation with counterparts 
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from other jurisdictions, prior to agreements reached by COAG. Agency officials 
also play a role in preparing papers for COAG, COAG Councils and Senior 
Officials meetings.  They also brief their own Ministers regarding agenda items 
prior to Council meetings, and, where necessary, liaise with officials from 
agencies within their own jurisdiction where agenda items might have 
implications for other portfolios.   
As Harwood and Phillimore state in their study on The Effects of COAG’s 
Reform Agenda on Central Agencies: 
Central66 and line67 agency officials regularly liaise with one another through 
formal gatherings, such as COAG working groups and sub-groups, senior 
officials meetings, Heads of Treasuries meetings and meetings of ministerial 
councils, and through informal channels, such as by telephone and emails.68 
Premier’s Departments in most jurisdictions also have branches or units 
dedicated to intergovernmental relations.69  According to the organisation chart 
on its website, the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, for example, has 
a “National Reform and Intergovernmental Strategy Branch.”  There is likewise 
a Commonwealth-State Relations Secretariat within the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet.  Treasury Departments also commonly have sections 
responsible for intergovernmental relations, among them the Fiscal and 
Economic Directorate of the NSW Treasury (see here).   
i. Secretariats 
COAG and most of its Councils are supported by some kind of secretariat 
arrangements.  The Secretariat for COAG is located within the Commonwealth-
State Relations Secretariat of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
(see contact details here).  Page 13 of the COAG Council Handbook says that 
the Commonwealth State-Relations Secretariat “is the central point of contact 
for submitting work to COAG.” 
The same page of the Handbook also indicates that questions relating to the 
staffing and location of secretariats for COAG Councils are to be determined by 
each Council in accordance with its own needs.   
Section 2 of the Handbook, entitled “Best-Practice Secretariat Operations”, sets 
out “some general principles that govern how secretariats should best operate 
and support their Council strategically.”  These principles include, but are not 
limited to: 
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  Premiers and Treasury Departments. 
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 Effective governance – secretariats should have strong governance systems 
and a good understanding of their stakeholder base and the issues managed 
by their Councils. 
 Transparency and accountability – Councils are accountable to COAG.  
Secretariats need to communicate clearly decisions and outcomes.  It is 
essential that secretariats employ strong stakeholder communication 
strategies so outcomes are transparent. 
. . . 
 Coordination capacity – secretariats should be the primary coordination point 
for their Councils.  It is essential that secretariats employ effective coordination 
strategies, particularly in relation to the priority tasks for their Councils. 
 Fairness – secretariats should be fair and impartial towards all member 
jurisdictions, regardless of secretariat location . . .70 
j. Participation by NSW in COAG Councils 
Premier's Memorandum M2012-05 Council of Australian Governments - New 
Council System, issued on 2 May 2012, sets out protocols for the engagement 
of State Ministers and agencies with the COAG Council system.   
The Memorandum states: 
It is essential that Ministers attending Council meetings or providing a response 
on Council matters are in a position to properly reflect the interests and views of 
the NSW Government. Ministers should decline to consider matters unless 
adequate notice of them has been given beforehand.   
The Memorandum contains guidance as to the kinds of matters that require 
consideration by either Cabinet or the Premier, prior to a Minister giving 
representations in relation to them on behalf of NSW: 
The following matters should come before Cabinet, unless the Premier specially 
approves otherwise: 
 Intergovernmental agreements to which NSW would potentially be a signatory; 
 Significant policy/funding decisions to be made by the Ministerial Council that 
have implications for NSW; and 
 Agenda items to be put forward from NSW relating to the above. 
It directs that copies of Council agendas, papers and briefing notes should be 
forwarded to the Director General of the Department of Premier and Cabinet 
upon their receipt by the relevant Minister or agency, and also that "results of 
Council meetings should . . . be reported to the Department of Premier and 
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Cabinet at the earliest opportunity."   
Where Council determinations have implications for more than one Ministerial 
portfolio, or a Council’s areas of responsibility are such that more than one 
NSW Minister is required to be a member of it, the Memo directs Ministers and 
agencies to ensure that the position of NSW has been coordinated prior to 
Council meetings:  
A coordinated NSW position should be developed in consultation with all relevant 
agencies prior to a Minister or Ministers taking part in Council determinations.  
New Councils will be expected to deal with a range of matters that may involve 
more than one portfolio.  Council Ministers and relevant agencies are required to 
liaise, as necessary, with other relevant Ministers and portfolios to ensure a 
coordinated NSW approach to policy development and response to matters 
considered by the Council. 
Coordinating Ministers have been appointed where Councils have more than 
one Minister from NSW as a member.  The Memorandum describes the role of 
the coordinating Minister as follows: 
The coordinating Minister will ensure a single NSW point of contact relating to 
Council business.  However, it is not the function of a coordinating Minister to 
represent NSW on all matters before the Council or take a lead role on matters 
not within their portfolio.  Ministers, as joint members of a Council, should consult 
one another concerning items on the agenda, or items that are to be proposed for 
the agenda, and clearly identify the relevant lead agency for each matter before 
the Council. 
For any Council matters that may affect more than one portfolio, the lead agency 
is responsible for ensuring that coordinated advice is provided. 
Where more than one Minister is a member of a Council, the Ministers involved 
should consult one another concerning items on the agenda to determine which 
Minister will speak or vote on a relevant item on behalf of NSW. 
The Memorandum also contains a link to a list which indicates the Ministers 
who represent NSW on each Council, and, where more than one Minister, 
shows which Minister is the coordinating Minister for that Council. 
On the practical question of funding arrangements for Council operations, the 
Memorandum states that, where there is more than one agency involved in the 
work of a Council, funding, “including any secretariat funding, should be 
apportioned between participating agencies as agreed by member NSW 
Ministers.” 
In relation Ministers who are not a member of a Council, the Memorandum 
states that they may provide any suggestions that they have for areas that 
might be suitable for COAG attention to the Premier, who might in turn “propose 
the matter for COAG consideration.” 
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5. THE COAG NATIONAL REFORM AGENDA 
The current COAG agenda has been described by Geoff Gallop, a former 
Deputy Chairman of the COAG Reform Council, as “certainly the most 
ambitious and far-reaching in agenda in its history.”71  The COAG website 
states that: 
COAG is currently pursuing a reform agenda aimed at improving economic and 
social participation, strengthening the national economy, creating a more 
sustainable and liveable Australia, delivering better health services and closing 
the gap in Indigenous disadvantage. 
This section provides a brief account of the background to the development of 
the current reform agenda. 
a. 2006 – the foundations of a new approach 
Prior to 2006, COAG had facilitated significant national reforms in areas such as 
competition policy and gun control.  At its February 2006 meeting, COAG 
agreed a new ‘National Reform Agenda’, “to help underpin Australia 's future 
prosperity”.72  The Agenda was comprised of three streams: human capital; 
competition and regulatory reform.73  The human capital stream encompassed 
issues related to the health system and the delivery of all stages of education, 
from early childhood to vocational training.  The February 2006 communiqué 
said of each stream that: 
 Human Capital: This stream focussed on outcomes needed to increase 
workforce participation and productivity.  The communiqué noted that policies 
"to improve health and education outcomes, and encourage and support work, 
are closely inter-related."  COAG agreed therefore that "all governments would 
commit to reform across health, education and training and encouraging and 
supporting work." 
 
 Competition: This stream was intended to be "a substantial addition to, and 
continuation of, the highly successful National Competition Policy reforms.  It 
will further boost competition, productivity and the efficient functioning of 
markets."  The reforms that were the focus of this stream were "initiatives in the 
areas of transport, energy, infrastructure regulation and planning and climate 
change technological innovation and adaptation." 
 
 Reducing the regulatory burden: In relation to this stream, the communiqué 
noted that "COAG agreed that effective regulation is essential to ensure 
markets operate efficiently and fairly, to protect consumers and the environment 
and to enforce corporate governance standards.  However, the benefits from 
each regulation must not be offset by unduly high compliance and 
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implementation costs."  COAG therefore agreed that governments would, 
among other things, implement measures aimed at the reducing compliance 
costs and enhancing regulatory consistency across jurisdictions.     
In the communiqué for its July 2006 meeting, COAG set out the work that had 
been undertaken towards the development of this Reform Agenda.  It stated: 
In moving forward, COAG has tasked officials with completing specific reform 
proposals for its consideration at its next meeting. These reform proposals will 
include, as necessary and appropriate, agreed policy directions, outcomes and 
commitments, multilateral and jurisdictional specific actions, progress measures 
and milestones. 
That communiqué also referred to the agreement that had been met in regard to 
the establishment of the COAG Reform Council, a body that would undertake 
“an independent assessment of the relative costs and benefits of each of the 
reform proposals” (see below for information regarding the role of the COAG 
Reform Council).    It may be seen from this that in the 2006 National Reform 
Agenda lay the seeds of COAG’s current suite of reforms, as well as the first 
steps towards its current focus on fostering accountability by ensuring that 
reforms are targeting measurable outcomes.   
b. Scope of the first Rudd Government’s agenda 
Before becoming Prime Minister in November 2007, Kevin Rudd had 
campaigned on the need to reform the way federalism was operating in 
Australia.  Upon his election, he continued work on the National Reform Agenda 
and instituted a range of additional reforms, using COAG as the vehicle for 
them.74  The new Government acted almost immediately in relation to this, 
holding a meeting on 20 December 2007, at which, Anderson says: 
The Prime Minister moved quickly . . . to change the dynamics of traditional 
intergovernmental relations by establishing a series of working parties charged 
with developing strategies and plans for implementing the government’s election 
policy commitments.  Each working party was chaired by a Commonwealth 
Minister with senior state or territory officials acting as their deputy, a procedure 
which the COAG Communiqué, in a masterful piece of understatement described 
as a ‘break with previous practice’.75 
The communiqué for the 20 December meeting indicated that, in a climate in 
which the Commonwealth and all States and Territories had governments of the 
same political stripe: 
COAG recognised that there was a unique opportunity for Commonwealth-State 
cooperation, to end the blame game and buck passing, and to take major steps 
forward for the Australian community. 
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COAG agreed to a new model of cooperation underpinned by more effective 
working arrangements.  COAG identified seven areas for its 2008 work agenda: 
 health and ageing; 
 the productivity agenda – including education, skills, training and early 
childhood; 
 climate change and water; 
 infrastructure; 
 business regulation and competition; 
 housing; and  
 Indigenous reform. 
There was a working group for each of the above reform priorities.  As the 
communiqué and its attachments show, each working group was given a set of 
objectives and an “indicative forward work plan”.  By the March 2008 meeting of 
COAG, the planned reforms in each of these areas had begun to take further 
shape (see communiqué).  Underpinning these reforms was the 
Intergovernmental Agreement for Federal Financial Relations, which 
represented a restructuring of the way in which the Commonwealth distributed 
funding to the States and Territories.  An overview of the Intergovernmental 
Agreement and the reforms it brought about is provided below in section 7.   
A key aspect of the reformed financial framework was a shift to a new system of 
agreements which reflected the objectives and desired outcomes of each 
reform, as stated by the March communiqué: 
The new agreements will focus on agreed outputs and outcomes, providing 
greater flexibility for jurisdictions to allocate resources to areas where they will 
produce the best outcomes for the community. 
This new approach was designed to increase accountability and ‘end the blame 
game’ between the Commonwealth and sub-national governments.   
An expanded role for the COAG Reform Council was also agreed at the March 
2008 meeting.  The Council was to monitor the implementation of national 
reforms and check progress against agreed milestones and outcomes.76  The 
role of the COAG Reform Council is outlined further below. 
McClintock has summarised the reform agenda that emerged throughout 2008 
in the following terms: 
The current COAG reform agenda was articulated by COAG throughout 2008. 
COAG committed to an agenda that would address the challenges of boosting 
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productivity, increasing workforce participation and mobility, and delivering better 
services to the community. COAG also agreed that its agenda would contribute 
to the broader goals of social inclusion, closing the gap on Indigenous 
disadvantage, and environmental sustainability.77 
However the number of Commonwealth-State agreements, and the reforms 
being progressed through COAG quickly burgeoned.  It would appear that this 
increase in the number of matters being addressed through COAG was driven, 
at least in part, by the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008.  The first Rudd 
Government used the COAG process to aid in the implementation of its 
response to “ensure rapid delivery of economic stimulus measures to support 
employment and growth and to foster a more resilient Australia”.78   
The scope of the reform agenda, and the complexity of reform agreements in 
areas like health care began to attract comment and criticism.  McQuestin 
writes that: 
In late 2010 there was a chorus of calls from premiers, business groups and 
commentators for a more streamlined, prioritised and manageable COAG 
agenda that would allow progress.79 
As McQuestin notes, shortly before the February 2011 meeting of COAG, 
Rudd’s successor as Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, published an opinion piece in 
the Australian Financial Review in which she flagged the need to rationalise and 
focus COAG’s reform agenda:   
With the National Competition Policy process of the early 1990s, COAG made a 
brilliant start but since 1996, COAG has gone from pillar to post — ignored and 
underutilised for years at a stretch, then frantically overworked.   
Neither approach did the cause of federal-state relations any good. 
Today it is clear that COAG needs a fundamental revitalisation if it is to perform 
the job the country so strongly needs it to do.   
There is a lot of work ahead if COAG is to simplify its agenda and recapture its 
original vision, a job made more imperative as genuine structural challenges bear 
down on us: challenges such as health, ports, and vocational education.   
To begin with, COAG needs to move to a more rational and streamlined focus. It 
must deal with only major strategic issues facing the country, and only issues that 
lie at the intersection of state and federal relations. To achieve this focus, I am 
proposing four key themes to guide the COAG agenda.80 
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After outlining what these were to be, the Prime Minister added: 
As part of this streamlined agenda, I first want ministers to focus on urgent and 
strategic issues, devolving more work to ministerial councils for resolution. 
This will allow COAG to drive urgent, large-scale reform without getting bogged 
down in some of the detailed discussions that can sometimes mean agenda 
items limp along from COAG meeting to COAG meeting, never really jumping off 
the page and into the real world. 
Ministerial councils will also have to learn to resolve issues among themselves, 
rather than taking the easy option of referring them up to COAG at the first sign 
of disagreement. 
COAG needs to reinvigorate the federal financial framework agreed in 2007, with 
a renewed focus on accountability. That means a focus on results, and a focus 
on incentives.81 
c. Current Reform Agenda 
As outlined at the outset of this paper, it is difficult to explain aspects of COAG 
and its processes precisely or specifically.  Work on COAG reforms is 
progressing all the time.  Priorities change with shifting circumstances, new 
agreements are negotiated at meetings of COAG and new Councils or other 
entities established.  This makes it difficult to paint an accurate point in time 
picture of the work that COAG currently has underway.  Added to this is the 
sheer scale of the work program, which, despite the 2011 efforts to contain it, 
remains very large, along with some of the transparency issues which are 
outlined in Part Two of this paper.  What is provided in this section, therefore, is 
a broad overview of the reform agenda, and details of where to find further 
information regarding specific reforms. 
The “COAG’s Reform Agenda” webpage states that: 
COAG has committed to an unprecedented program of reform built on one vision: 
improving the wellbeing of all Australians, now and into the future. 
Since December 2007, COAG has grown and has taken on an important new 
role. Australian governments realised that the challenges they faced – including 
the need to raise productivity and our standard of living, prepare for a quickly 
expanding ageing population, secure water supplies, educate our people and 
build a low carbon future – were so complex that they could only be met by all 
governments working together. 
COAG recognises that the Australian people want to see governments working 
together to ensure that the Australia of 10, 20 or 50 years' time has adequately 
addressed the issues that will impact on the quality of life of our children and their 
children.  
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After noting COAG’s key commitments to making federalism work, the 
collaborative federalism embodied in the new federal financial relations 
framework and the oversight of reform progress by an independent umpire, the 
COAG Reform Council, the reform agenda webpage explains that COAG’s 
current agenda is centred on “five themes of strategic importance.”   These 
themes were agreed by COAG at its meeting of 13 February 2011 (see 
communiqué).  They are: 
1. a long-term strategy for economic and social participation; 
2. a national economy driven by our competitive advantages; 
3. a more sustainable and liveable Australia; 
4. better health services and a more sustainable health system for all Australians; 
and 
5. Closing the Gap on Indigenous disadvantage. 
The reform agenda webpage also contains a series of links to the various policy 
areas in which reform is currently being pursued through the COAG process.  
These include: 
 Early Childhood; 
 
 Schools and Education;  
 
 Health and Aging;  
 
 Skills and Training; 
 
 Housing and Homelessness; 
 
 Disability Care and Support;  
 
 A Seamless National Economy;  
 
 Infrastructure and Transport;  
 
 Water, Climate Change and the Environment;  
 
 National Security and Community Safety; and  
 
 Closing the Gap on Indigenous Disadvantage.   
These links provide a wealth of information about the wide range of initiatives 
that either have already been implemented or are underway or proposed in 
each area.  Links to the many current and previous National Partnerships and 
Agreements, via which the reforms in each of these areas are being 
implemented, are also provided.  Links to the outcomes of COAG meetings at 
which decisions have been made about each area of reform are also available. 
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Perhaps a more useful source is the Standing Council on Federal Financial 
Relations website, which sets out links to Agreements as well as to 
implementation plans for each jurisdiction where relevant, and gives indications 
of the start and end dates for the Agreements (see for example this webpage 
for education Agreements and Plans).   
Even a cursory reading of the above list of reform areas demonstrates the 
enormous scope of the work of COAG.  Reforms either currently being driven, 
or already delivered, through the COAG process include the Murray-Darling 
Basin Plan, the Australian Consumer Law, the new Personal Property 
Securities regime and health initiatives such as Medicare Locals, the NDIS or 
“DisabilityCare”, and the National Education Reform Agreement, developed 
following the Review of Funding for Schooling, undertaken by a panel chaired 
by David Gonski (see COAG communiqué, 19 April 2013, and also the Better 
Schools for Australia website). 
6. IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL REFORM 
The of mechanisms that are used to implement national reform can take a 
range of forms, as described by Saunders: 
A cooperative arrangement is evidenced by an intergovernmental agreement, 
which may take a variety of forms but is typically not assumed to create legal 
relations so that, again typically, it is not enforceable at law.  Alternatively, or in 
addition, cooperation may take the form of a grant of funds by the 
Commonwealth to a state pursuant to section 96 of the Constitution, which may 
be subject to more or less detailed conditions.  Any one of these techniques, and 
in some cases, all three, may be associated with a fourth: schemes designed to 
achieve a greater or lesser degree of harmonisation of policy and law.82   
In a paper published in 2012, the current Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia, Robert French, identified the following “techniques of cooperative 
federalism directed to national or uniform regulation”: 
1. Intergovernmental agreements providing for: 
(a) uniform legislation enacted separately by each participating polity; or 
(b) enactment by one unit in the federation of a standard law which can then 
be adopted by other parties to the intergovernmental agreement. 
2. The referral of state legislative powers authorising Commonwealth law-
making under section 51(xxxvii) [the referral power of the Constitution] on a 
particular topic or according to the text of a proposed Bill. 
3. Executive cooperation by way of intergovernmental agreements. 83 
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As Kildea notes, “perhaps the most important activity in which the various 
Ministers and officials are involved is the negotiation and formation of 
intergovernmental agreements”. 84  Although they might require jurisdictions to 
pass legislation to give effect to the various commitments they contain, these 
agreements themselves have no legal effect.85  They are simply a reflection of 
the actions that the executive of each participating jurisdiction has agreed to 
undertake.  Many of these actions are administrative in nature, meaning that the 
terms of such agreements are rarely subjected to parliamentary scrutiny. 
7. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL 
RELATIONS  
The delivery of COAG reforms is facilitated by the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations (IGA on Federal Financial Relations) 
(for schedules to the IGA, see here).86  The IGA on Federal Financial Relations 
was agreed by COAG on 29 November 2008 (see this communiqué from the 
relevant meeting).    The IGA is an agreement between all jurisdictions on how 
the Commonwealth is to provide funding to the States and Territories.  It was 
“designed to focus the efforts of relevant governments on the achievement of 
agreed high level policy outcomes.”87  “COAG’s Reform Agenda” webpage 
summarises the further aims of the IGA as follows: 
The [IGA on Federal Financial Relations] aims to enhance collaborative 
federalism by reducing the previous complexity of the Commonwealth’s financial 
relations with the States and the Territories, promoting greater flexibility in service 
delivery, and enhancing public accountability for achieving outcomes. 
Information about the IGA is available on the website of the Standing Council on 
Federal Financial Relations, which oversees the operation of the IGA (see the 
Council’s terms of reference).  It is chaired by the Commonwealth Treasurer, 
and its members are the Treasurers of each sub-national jurisdiction.   
Amongst the information available on the Standing Council’s website is this 
‘toolkit for drafters of new agreements’.  This is comprised of several useful 
documents, including A Short Guide to the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Federal Financial Relations and the Financial Relations Framework. 
An analysis of the intricacies of the vexed history of federal financial relations is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  What follows in this section is instead an 
overview of the IGA and some of the background to its implementation.    
a.   Former funding arrangements 
Prior to the commencement of the IGA on Federal Financial Relations, the 
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Commonwealth provided funding to the States and Territories through either 
general purpose grants or specific purpose payments (SPPs) (or “tied grants”).  
As Twomey and Withers stated: 
These payments are tied to conditions imposed by the Commonwealth.  In this 
way the Commonwealth can dictate aspects of state policy.88 
Such payments are generally made by the Commonwealth under its “grants 
power”, section 96 of the Commonwealth Constitution (the Constitution).  While 
the Commonwealth has employed tied grants to provide funding to the States 
since the 1920s, their use became more ubiquitous from the 1960s onwards.89  
By the 2006-07 financial year, the Commonwealth was providing funds to the 
States under at least 90 separate SPPs, and the amount paid under these 
agreements “amounted to approximately 42 per cent of the total payments 
made by the Commonwealth to the States.”90   
The Commonwealth’s employment of SPPs as a means of funding the States 
had long been controversial.  Twomey and Withers quote the following 
observation by Access Economics, which summarises some concerns that had 
been raised in relation to the use of SPPs: 
[SPPs] often impose excessively detailed and distorting conditions on how the 
States exercise even their (constitutionally) exclusive functions.  As a result, tied 
grants can be costly intrusions into State functions and responsibilities, resulting 
in overlap, duplication and other inefficiencies.91 
Prior to the 2007 election, then Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd established an 
“ALP Advisory Group”, comprised of academics with relevant expertise, and 
charged it with the development of a “new framework for Commonwealth-state 
relations that would ‘reduce inefficiency, duplication, and the opportunity for 
blame shifting and cost shifting.’”92  As McQuestin writes, the Advisory Group 
was specifically asked to consider reform options for SPPs, amongst a range of 
other matters.93   
In July 2007, the Advisory Group produced a discussion paper entitled A 
Framework Guide to the Future Development of Specific Purpose Payments 
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(SPPs).  This paper noted: 
SPPs have a long history in Australia, and since the 1960s they have become a 
very significant source of funding.  This development of the Commonwealth’s role 
in areas such as education, health, and transport, which account for more than 
three quarters of total SPPs, is for the most part accepted by the States.  
Certainly the States have become dependent on the funds that are provided 
through SPPs . . .  
It seems most likely therefore that SPPs will continue, but there are a number of 
problems that need to be addressed if SPPs are to be more effective in achieving 
their legitimate purpose of achieving what are genuinely national objectives.94       
The Advisory Group paper then listed the problems that had been identified with 
the former system of SPPs, including: 
 a lack of clarity regarding which level of government was responsible for 
what; 
 
 an attendant lack of accountability; 
 
 blame shifting as well as cost shifting; 
 
 inefficiencies; and  
 
 administrative duplication.95   
It also noted that there had been a recent “proliferation of small SPPs, that have 
no obvious national purpose and which seem principally designed to give 
Federal members of parliament a local political advantage.”96   
The Advisory Group paper explained that the “overriding objective” of reforming 
the payment system “must be to enhance and support co-operative federalism”, 
adding: 
In their modern form, SPPs have come to represent the practical expression of 
Federalism.  SPPs are a legitimate means of achieving a genuine national 
purpose, but they should be directed to that national purpose and based on a 
genuine national partnership built between the Commonwealth and the States.  
Unfortunately under the current government SPPs have frequently been the 
mechanism for Coercive Federalism with the Commonwealth dictating conditions 
to the States.  Often these conditions have nothing to do with the objectives of 
the program (eg industrial relations conditions on program funding), or they seek 
to dictate delivery processes where there is no need for national uniformity and 
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where diversity and experimentation might better achieve the programs 
objectives.97  
The paper proposed a principled reform of the payment system, to rationalise 
the number of SPPs and ensure that the Commonwealth was only “involved in 
those issues that were traditionally managed by the States where 
Commonwealth-State inter-action is necessary to enhance efficiency, equity 
and/or access or . . . basic rights and heritage.”98  It concluded that: 
For those areas where it is agreed that shared responsibility between the 
Commonwealth and the States should continue, the aim should be to identify and 
agree on the respective roles of each level of government.  Collaborative 
federalism should then be founded on a partnership between the Commonwealth 
and the States, where there is proper consultation on program objectives and 
information demands.  The States would then have considerable discretion and 
more flexibility as to how they achieve those objectives, having regard to their 
particular local circumstances.99  
b. Reforms of the first Rudd Government 
As noted, the IGA on Federal Financial Relations was agreed by COAG in 
November 2008, following a series of negotiations between the Commonwealth 
and the States and Territories.  The key elements of the agreement had been 
signalled at the March 2008 meeting of COAG.  The communiqué for that 
meeting advised that: 
The new financial framework will result in a significant rationalisation of SPPs, 
primarily through combining many into a smaller number of new national SPP 
agreements, with a reduction in total Commonwealth funding for these activities.  
This reform will see a reduction from the current 92 SPPs to five or six new 
national agreements for delivery of core government services – health, affordable 
housing, early childhood and schools, vocational education and training, and 
disability services. 
These reforms will clarify roles and responsibilities, reduce duplication and waste 
and enhance the accountability to the community.  The objectives and outcomes 
for each of the new agreements will replace input controls in current agreements. 
The new agreements will focus on agreed outputs and outcomes, providing 
greater flexibility for jurisdictions to allocate resources to areas where they will 
produce the best outcomes for the community. 
New NP arrangements will provide incentives for reform, or for funding for 
specific projects, in areas of joint responsibility, such as transport, regulation, 
environment, water and early childhood. 
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For all new arrangements, a new performance and assessment framework will be 
developed to support public reporting against performance measures and 
milestones.100 
Former West Australian Premier and Deputy Chairman of the COAG Reform 
Council, Geoff Gallop, said of the IGA: 
The intergovernmental agreement incorporates a number of key features, or 
principles of federal financial relations.  These include: a simplification of the 
financial arrangements between the Commonwealth and the states; an 
outcomes-based approach to service delivery commitments; a clearer articulation 
of the roles and responsibilities of the two levels of government; incentives for 
reform; and performance reporting and accountability.101 
The IGA on Federal Financial Relations commenced on 1 January 2009 and is 
open ended.102  It has been amended 3 times to date (for example to reflect the 
agreement reached in relation to national health reform in 2011).103   
c. Terms of the IGA on Federal Financial Relations 
Clause 5 of the IGA states that the objective of the agreement is “the 
improvement of the well-being of all Australians”, which is to be achieved 
through: 
(a) collaborative working arrangements, including clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities and fair and sustainable financial arrangements, to facilitate a 
focus by the Parties on long term policy development and enhanced 
government service delivery; 
(b) enhanced public accountability through simpler, standardised and more 
transparent performance reporting by all jurisdictions, with a focus on the 
achievement of outcomes, efficient service delivery and timely public 
reporting; 
(c) reduced administration and compliance overheads; 
(d) stronger incentives to implement economic and social reforms; 
(e) the on-going provision of Goods and Services Tax (GST) payments to the 
States and Territories equivalent to the revenue received from the GST; and 
(f) the equalisation of fiscal capacities between States and Territories.104 
Clause 8 of the IGA on Federal Financial Relations states that the intention 
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behind the agreement is: 
. . . to improve the well-being of all Australians through improvements in the 
quality, efficiency and effectiveness of government service delivery by: 
(a) reducing Commonwealth prescriptions on service delivery by the States and 
Territories; 
(b) clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Parties in the delivery of 
government services that are the subject of National Agreements set out in 
schedules to [the IGA]; and 
(c) enhancing accountability to the public for the outcomes of achieved or 
outputs delivered under National Agreements or National Partnerships. 
The IGA on Federal Financial Relations is supported by the Federal Financial 
Relations Act 2009 (Cth).  This Standing Council on Federal Financial Relations 
website explains: 
The Act provides a standing appropriation for the Commonwealth to make 
ongoing financial contributions to the States through four National Specific 
Purpose Payments and National Health Reform funding, and for the Treasurer to 
determine GST payments to the States. The Act also provides for the Treasurer, 
through a written determination, to credit amounts to the COAG Reform Fund for 
the purpose of making grants of National Partnership payments and general 
revenue assistance to the States.  
The website goes on to comment: 
For the first time in decades, the complexity of all the Commonwealth's financial 
relations with the States is contained in one piece of legislation. This improves 
the public transparency of these payments and the ability of the Parliament to 
scrutinise the payment arrangements. 
For Professor Saunders, on the other hand, analysis of the actual agreements 
reached under the revised Federal Financial Agreement framework “suggests 
that they will further transfer authority from parliaments to governments acting 
pursuant to agreements, ‘implementation plans’ and one-line appropriations.”105 
i) Specific Purpose Payments under the IGA 
One feature of the IGA on Federal Financial Relations was the rationalisation of 
the number of SPPs from over 90 to just five, “to be spent in the key service 
delivery sectors”.106   
Gallop explains that the focus on outcomes, which is one principle underpinning 
the IGA on Federal Financial Relations, has: 
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. . . involved a major change in the way Commonwealth payments are made in 
these service areas.  In particular, the number of national specific purpose 
payments has been consolidated to five and there has been a move away from 
prescriptions on service delivery with financial and other input controls.  Instead, 
the five national [SPPs] – as provided for in the intergovernmental agreement 
and the Federal Financial Relations Act 2009 (Cth) – are ongoing contributions 
from the Commonwealth to the states and territories to be spent on the key 
service delivery areas.  The states and territories are required to spend each 
SPP in the relevant service sector, but they have full budget flexibility to allocate 
funds within that sector as they see fit to achieve the agreed objectives of that 
sector.107 
The SPP webpage on the website of the Standing Council on Federal Financial 
Relations states that these SPPs allow the Commonwealth to support the 
efforts of the States “in delivering services in the major service delivery sectors”.   
There are currently four SPPs: 
 National Schools SPP;  
 
 National Skills and Workforce Development SPP;  
 
 National Disability Services SPP; and  
 
 National Affordable Housing SPP.  
The webpage explains that:  
The National SPPs are distributed among the States in accordance with 
population shares based on the Australian Statistician's determination of States' 
population shares as at 31 December of that year. In recognition that an 
immediate shift to equal per capita shares may have implications for State 
allocations, an equal per capita distribution is being phased in over five years 
from 2009-10.  
States and Territories are required to spend the funding received in accordance 
with these SPPs in the service sector to which the agreement pertains.108   
The fifth SPP, that regarding National Healthcare, was replaced in July 2012 by 
the National Health Reform Agreement.109   
ii)  National Agreements 
The SPPs are supplemented by National Agreements.  These National 
Agreements can be found on this webpage on the website of the Standing 
Council on Federal Financial Relations.   
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Gallop explains that: 
The National Agreements are the agreements made in respect of the six service 
delivery areas where both the Commonwealth and the states and territories have 
responsibilities: education, skills, healthcare, disability, affordable housing and 
Indigenous reform.  The focus on outcomes (as opposed to inputs) is an 
organising principle of the National Agreements.  Governments have agreed a 
set of objectives, outcomes, outputs and performance indicators for which they 
will be held publicly accountable.110 
There remains a National Agreement for Healthcare, even though the SPP itself 
has been replaced by the National Healthcare Reform Agreement.  The 
National Agreement for National Indigenous Reform is perhaps better known by 
its ‘Closing the Gap’ title.  There is no SPP for this National Agreement, “as 
funding associated with the other National Agreements (in the areas of health, 
education, disability, housing, and vocational education and training) is required 
to be implemented consistently” with the Closing the Gap agreement.111     
The list below provides links to each agreement: 
 National Healthcare Agreement 
 
 National Education Agreement 
 
 National Agreement for Skills and Workforce Development 
 
 National Disability Agreement 
 
 National Affordable Housing Agreement 
 
 National Indigenous Reform Agreement (Closing the Gap) 
As may be seen from this webpage on the website of the Standing Council on 
Federal Financial Relations, each of these agreements has been renewed in 
the past year.  There is also a new National Education Reform Agreement, 
which at this stage has only been signed by the Commonwealth, NSW, the ACT 
and South Australia (see this webpage).  Clause 14 of the National Education 
Reform Agreement provides that it is intended to supersede the National 
Education Agreement: 
14. If a State or Territory signs this Agreement prior to 1 January 2014, on 1 
January 2014 it will cease to be a Party to the National Education Agreement and 
the following National Partnership Agreements:  
a. Rewards for Great Teachers; and  
b. Low Socio-Economic Status School Communities.  
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The National Agreements webpage states that: 
National Agreements define the objectives, outcomes, outputs and performance 
indicators, and clarify the roles and responsibilities that will guide the 
Commonwealth and the States in the delivery of services across a particular 
sector. 
For example, the current National Education Agreement states its objectives 
as follows: 
9. Through this Agreement, the Parties commit to the objective that all Australian 
school students acquire  the  knowledge  and  skills  to  participate  effectively  in  
society  and  employment  in  a globalised economy. 
10. This objective will also be pursued through the National Declaration on 
Educational  Goals for Young Australians and supported by SCSEEC Indigenous 
Education policy directions and action plans. 
11. All aspects of this Agreement contribute to, or measure progress towards, the 
objective. 
The desired outcomes of the agreement are specified in clause 12: 
12. The Agreement will contribute to the following outcomes: (a) all children are 
engaged in and benefiting from schooling; (b) young people are meeting basic 
literacy and numeracy standards, and overall levels of literacy and numeracy 
achievement are improving; (c) Australian students excel by international 
standards; (d) schooling promotes the social inclusion and reduces the 
educational disadvantage of children, especially Indigenous children; and (e) 
young people make a successful transition from school to work and further study 
The measurable targets that COAG has agreed must be met to achieve 
these objectives and outcomes are: 
13. COAG has agreed to the following targets, which are critical to the 
achievement of the objective and outcomes above:  
(a) Lift the Year 12 or equivalent or Certificate II attainment rate to 90 per cent by 
2015;  
(b) Lift the Year 12 or equivalent or Certificate III attainment rate to 90 per cent by 
2020;  
(c) Halve the gap for Indigenous students in reading, writing and numeracy by 
2018; and  
(d) At least halve the gap for Indigenous students in Year 12 or equivalent 
attainment rates by 2020.  
In relation to outputs, the introductory clauses of the Agreement note that: 
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14. This Agreement will contribute to a range of outputs which support 
achievement of the agreed outcomes for schooling. Outputs include student 
enrolments disaggregated by school sector and Indigenous status. 
Clause 17 of the National Education Agreement sets the shared roles of the 
Commonwealth, States and Territories.  These include: 
 (a) jointly responsible for developing, progressing and reviewing the national 
objectives and outcomes for schooling;  
(b) jointly responsible for funding school education to enable improved 
performance in the nationally agreed outcomes and to achieve national 
objectives;  
. . .  
 (d) responsible for working together to develop evidence to support the 
achievement of the national objectives and outcomes, and to promote its 
application to policy and practice;  
(e) jointly responsible for designing the funding mechanism by which the 
Commonwealth allocates funds to States and Territories to support improved 
service delivery and reform;  
. . . 
 (h) responsible for the development and maintenance of a National Curriculum 
and for participating in the work of the national education authority that manages 
national curriculum, assessment and data management, analysis and reporting; 
and  
(i) jointly responsible for a nationally consistent system of teaching standards.  
Clause 18 of the National Education Agreement goes on to provide that the 
roles of the Commonwealth are: 
(a) allocating funding to States and Territories to support improved service 
delivery and reform to meet nationally agreed outcomes and to achieve the 
national objective, including for students with particular needs;  
(b) ensuring that the funding arrangements for non-government school systems 
and schools are consistent with, and support the responsibilities of the States 
and Territories in respect of regulation, educational quality, performance and 
reporting on educational outcomes;  
(c) higher education policy, including its impact on pre-service and post-graduate 
teacher education and teacher supply through setting higher education national 
priorities, and its funding of universities; Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Federal Financial Relations; 
(d) investing in actions to secure nationally agreed policy priorities, in 
consultation with States and Territories; and  
NSW Parliamentary Research Service 
 
42 
(e) ensuring that funding agreements between the Commonwealth and non-
government authorities will include a provision that the non-government 
school sector will work with Governments within each state or territory to 
ensure their participation in relevant aspects of this agreement. 
Clause 19 of the National Education Agreement completes this overview of the 
role of the various levels of government by providing that the role of States and 
Territories includes: 
 (a) ensuring that all school aged children are given the opportunity to enrol in a 
safe and supportive school that provides a quality education, including where 
students have particular needs. States and Territories are also responsible for 
ensuring that children of compulsory school-age attend school and therefore are 
responsible for  
(i) developing policy;  
(ii)  delivering services;  
(iii)  monitoring and reviewing performance of individual schools; and  
(iv) regulating schools; so as to work towards national objectives and 
achievement of outcomes compatible with local circumstances and priorities;  
(b) ensuring that schools provide clear performance reporting to parents, carers 
and to their local communities;  
(c) the regulatory framework for all schools, including registration and 
accreditation, educational quality and their performance in educational outcomes, 
in monitoring and reviewing performance of school systems;  
(d) the employment conditions of teachers in the government school sector, and 
its impact on teacher supply;  
(e) implementing the National Curriculum . . . 
iii) National Partnership payments 
The IGA on Federal Financial Relations also established National Partnership 
payments (or NPs), which were “to support the delivery of specified outputs or 
projects, to facilitate reforms or to reward those jurisdictions that deliver on 
nationally significant reforms.”112   
The webpage on National Partnerships on the website of the Standing Council 
on Federal Financial Relations notes that NPs “may include Implementation 
Plans which outline the specific performance benchmarks which may, when 
attained by a State, trigger a payment from the Commonwealth.”  
Implementation Plans are “usually bilateral agreements between the 
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Commonwealth and one state or territory which are negotiated between the 
state or territory portfolio Minister and the Commonwealth portfolio Minister.”113 
The homepage of the website of the Standing Council on Federal Financial 
Relations further explains the categories of National Partnership payments: 
Each National Partnership payment is supported by a National Partnership 
agreement which defines the mutually agreed objectives, outputs and 
performance benchmarks or milestones. 
As part of the Heads of Treasuries Review of National Agreements, National 
Partnerships and Implementation Plans, a new form of National Partnership 
agreement called a Project Agreement will be used to implement projects that are 
considered low value or low risk. 
National Partnership project payments are a financial contribution to the States to 
deliver specific projects, including improving the quality or quantity of service 
delivery, or projects that support national objectives. 
The Government also recognises the need to support States to undertake priority 
reforms. Consequently, in areas that are a national priority - for example, 
implementing the seamless national economy - National Partnership facilitation 
payments may be paid to the States in advance of progressing or achieving 
nationally significant reform, in recognition of administrative and other costs of 
initiating those reforms or pursuing continuous improvement in service delivery. 
National Partnership reward payments are provided to States that deliver 
nationally significant reform. Reward payments are structured in a way that 
encourages achievement of ambitious performance benchmarks detailed in a 
National Partnership agreement. Reward payments are contingent on the 
achievement of performance benchmarks, with achievement for each jurisdiction 
assessed by the independent COAG Reform Council . 
According to the COAG Reform Council (CRC), as of September 2012, there 
were 59 “currently active” National Partnerships.114  The proliferation of these 
kinds of agreements, which are typically more prescriptive than SPPs, has 
caused concern in some quarters about their capacity to undermine the 
objectives of the IGA on Federal Financial Relations (discussed below at part d. 
of this section).   
iv)  General revenue payments and the GST 
As noted, the Commonwealth also provides funding to the States and 
Territories via general revenue payments.  This funding is “untied”, meaning 
that the States and Territories can spend it on any purpose.115   
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The revenue raised by the GST is returned to the States and Territories in the 
form of these general revenue payments.116  As noted above, clause 5(f) of the 
IGA on Federal Financial Relations indicates that one of the objectives of the 
agreement is the equalisation of fiscal capacities between States and 
Territories.   
As the Commonwealth Parliament’s Joint Committee of Public Accounts and 
Audit explained in its 2011 Report 427 – Inquiry into National Funding 
Agreements: 
The amount of GST payable to the states and territories is determined by the 
Commonwealth Treasurer.  The Commonwealth Grants Commission makes 
recommendations to the Treasurer on the distribution of the GST in accordance 
with the principles of Horizontal Fiscal Equalisation . . .117       
The Commonwealth Grants Commission defines Horizontal Fiscal Equalisation 
or HFE as: 
State governments should receive funding from the pool of GST revenue such 
that, after allowing for material factors affecting revenues and expenditures, each 
would have the fiscal capacity to provide services and the associated 
infrastructure at the same standard, if each made the same effort to raise 
revenue from its own sources and operated at the same level of efficiency.118 
HFE is a long-standing practice in Australia.  The rationale underpinning it has 
been explained as follows: 
Since 1910, the Australian Government has provided some form of financial 
support for fiscally weaker States. The view was taken that, unless some type of 
intervention occurred, the Federation would be unsustainable. Less endowed 
States with weaker financial positions would have had to reduce services and/or 
raise additional revenue. To enable the poorer (and smaller) States to provide 
services to their residents at anything close to the same standard, it was 
recognised that a mechanism was required to adjust their fiscal capacities 
through special grants.119 
The practice is controversial, as the strong or improved economic performance 
of a jurisdiction can lead to proposed or actual reduction in the share of GST 
revenue it receives, as is currently the case with Western Australia.120  
On 30 March 2011, the Commonwealth Government commissioned a review of 
the system by which the GST is distributed amongst the jurisdictions.121  A 
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panel comprised of John Brumby, Bruce Carter and Nick Greiner was appointed 
to: 
…consider whether the current approach to distributing the GST… would ensure 
that Australia is best placed to respond to the expected significant structural 
changes in the economy and would maintain public confidence in the financial 
relations within the Federation.122   
The panel stressed in its First Interim Report that the Review was “not a debate 
about whether HFE should continue”, but that there was room for the 
improvement of the process by which GST was redistributed, “however sound 
the underlying principles.”123   The Review published three reports, a First 
Interim Report (March 2012), a Second Interim Report (June 2012) and a Final 
Report, which was released publicly on 30 November 2012.   
The COAG communiqué for the 7 December 2012 meeting indicated: 
COAG discussed the Report of the GST Distribution Review and requested that it 
be considered by Treasurers with a report back to COAG by the Commonwealth 
Treasurer in 2013. 
d. Issues with the IGA on Federal Financial Relations 
The IGA is generally recognised as a “significant reform”.124  However, a 
number of concerns have been raised about whether the principles of the IGA 
on Federal Financial Relations have been applied in practice.   
For example, questions have been raised about whether the targets contained 
within the agreements are measurable, and also in relation to the quality of the 
data provided; the size of the administrative burden that collecting data and 
providing it to the CRC places on agencies is another source of concern.125  It 
should be noted, however, that in its 2012 Progress Report, the CRC stated that 
while data quality issues remained, work has been done to address these 
issues, and the revised National Agreements, signed by COAG in 2012, 
contained “significantly improved performance reporting frameworks.”126  A 
further field of discussion regarding the IGA on Federal Financial Relations 
relates to whether Commonwealth and State and Territory officials are really 
committed to the principles of the IGA, or whether some effort is required to 
bring about cultural change.127   
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Other concerns that have been raised are connected with the kind of long-
standing issues identified with the funding arrangements existing prior to the 
implementation of the IGA on Federal Financial Relations.  For instance, 
several observers have commented that National Partnerships, or NPs, which 
have proliferated in number, provide the Commonwealth with a “backdoor” 
opportunity to continue its former practice of placing prescriptive conditions on 
the funding it provides to the States and Territories.128  This concern has been 
noted by COAG, as indicated by the communiqué for its July 2012 meeting:  
COAG discussed ongoing concerns about the proliferation of National 
Agreements, National Partnership Agreements and Project Agreements. COAG 
is committed to ensuring that only matters of truly national significance will be 
progressed as new multilateral National Partnership Agreements, with 
consideration of existing or alternative funding mechanisms before any new 
funding agreements are entered into. To support this, the working group which 
will consider expiring agreements will also consider and recommend measures to 
streamline the development and administration of selected funding agreements, 
for reporting to COAG at its December 2012 meeting.   
The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit’s Inquiry into National 
Funding Agreements also received submissions suggesting that the 
Implementation Plans for funding agreements were another area in which 
“reassertion of Commonwealth control over funding was evident”, and that, 
contrary to the principles of the IGA on Federal Financial Relations, 
Implementation Plans “were often prescriptive and focused on inputs rather 
than outcomes.”129 A further criticism that has been expressed regarding the 
arrangements made under the IGA on Federal Financial Relations is that that 
the National Agreements and National Partnerships do not adequately define 
the roles of the respective levels of government.130  The clarification of the roles 
of the respective governments in cooperative arrangements “was a key element 
of Rudd’s federalism.”131  Again, it should be noted that in its 2012 Progress 
Report, the COAG Reform Council (CRC) found that roles and responsibilities 
were generally clearly defined in agreements, although it noted in relation to 
National Agreements that “[i]n making this assessment” it was “not assessing 
the policy merits of the specified responsibilities, just whether they are clearly 
defined.”132   
A lack of clarity regarding which level of government has responsibility for what 
can lead to gaps in accountability.  This was observed by Chief Justice French 
in his 2012 paper, in which he noted that the outcomes of cooperation between 
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the Commonwealth, States and Territories can “diffuse accountability.”133  By 
way of example, his paper contains the following quote from a 2008 article in 
the Canberra Times on the Murray-Darling Basin Water Agreement: 
Who’s in charge and who will we hang if it doesn’t work out? Who’s actually 
deciding things?134 
Concerns relating to issues of accountability and the conditional provision of 
funding are matters connected to the structure of Australia’s federal system of 
government, which are outlined in Part Two of this paper.  The Senate Select 
Committee noted in its 2011 report, while the “existing mechanisms”, including 
the IGA on Federal Financial Relations, had “improved fiscal arrangements, 
ultimately . . . they do not address the underlying fiscal imbalance itself.”135     
8. MEASURING PROGRESS: THE COAG REFORM COUNCIL 
The COAG Reform Council or CRC is an independent body which has the task 
of overseeing the progress being made towards the implementation of reforms 
by each jurisdiction.  At its March 2008 meeting, COAG agreed “a new and 
expanded role for the CRC” which included: 
. . . that, when requested by COAG, the CRC will report to the Prime Minister:  
•  on a case by case basis on the publication of performance information for all 
jurisdictions against national SPPs outcomes and progress measures;  
•  production of an analytic overview of performance information for each SPP, 
noting that the CRC would draw on a range of sources, including existing 
subject experts;  
• the independent assessment of whether predetermined milestones and 
performance benchmarks have been achieved before an incentive payment to 
reward nationally-significant reforms under NP payments is made;  
•  through the assessment and reporting process, highlighting examples of good 
practice and performance, although not extending to a policy-advising role; and  
•  monitoring the aggregate pace of activity in progressing COAG’s agreed reform 
agenda.136  
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COAG also agreed that the CRC would continue with the reporting 
responsibilities conferred upon it in relation to the initial National Reform 
Agenda in 2007, and also undertake other tasks referred to it unanimously by 
COAG.137  One noteworthy feature of the establishment of the CRC is “the 
absence of parliamentary involvement in the constitution of such an apparently 
significant body”, which Saunders describes as “extraordinary.”138  The CRC is 
not accountable to the Commonwealth Parliament, and there is no requirement 
that its reports be tabled.139   
The “COAG’s Reform Agenda” webpage describes the role of the CRC as 
follows: 
The COAG Reform Council is an independent umpire, funded by all jurisdictions, 
that reports regularly and publicly on the performance of the Commonwealth, 
States and Territories in achieving the agreed outcomes and performance 
benchmarks specified in National Agreements and some National Partnership 
agreements. The Council also reports on the aggregate pace of activity in 
progressing COAG‘s agreed reform agenda. In doing so, it ensures governments 
are held accountable for the commitments they make through COAG. We can 
then know whether COAG’s investments are delivering real and improved 
services to the Australian community. 
Gallop says of the CRC that at “the heart of the Council’s role is the bringing to 
life of one of COAG’s key principles articulated in the [IGA on Federal Financial 
Relations] – to enhance the accountability of governments through public 
monitoring and reporting.”140  As noted, the CRC is independent of all 
governments, and reports directly to COAG.141  However, as Saunders notes, 
the CRC’s: 
. . .   function of monitoring progress within intergovernmental goals can hardly 
substitute for the accountability of governments to parliaments and hence to the 
people that Australian model of representative democracy and responsible 
government assumes.142  
A good source of information regarding the CRC is its website, which provides 
access to information about its functions and also to its publications, including 
its reports to COAG regarding progress in each reform area, and its reports on 
the progress of the reform agenda as a whole, the most recent of which was 
published in 2012.  The 2012 Progress Report provides the following overview 
of progress on COAG reforms: 
Progress is being made but change is not easy and it can take longer than 
expected 
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 COAG has agreed to a diverse and ambitious set of reforms which span a 
range of economic, social and environmental challenges. 
 50% of the 30 key reforms we assessed are on track; 40% are likely to be 
delayed. 
 A number of reforms have proved very complex to achieve – especially those 
aimed at creating a seamless national economy and closing the gap in 
Indigenous disadvantage. 
 Two reforms are at risk of not being achieved: nationally consistent 
occupational health and safety laws and competition reforms in the energy 
sector.143 
The difficulty of the CRC’s task is recognised by Fenna, who writes: 
Translating the complex, contested, qualitative world of public policy into agreed-
upon and meaningful quantitative indicators is difficult.  Ensuring that those 
indicators are accurately linked to output-outcome causalities that are often 
unclear is more challenging still.  And finally, doing that across levels of 
government in a federal system in a way that will promote learning and increase 
accountability makes it all a decidedly ambitious, if not herculean task.144 
At its March 2008 meeting, COAG also agreed that the Productivity 
Commission would assist the CRC with its role by reporting “to COAG on the 
economic impacts and benefits of COAG’s agreed reform agenda every two to 
three years.”145  The first of these reports was published by the Productivity 
Commission in May 2012.146  
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PART TWO – ISSUES  
9. COAG & FEDERALISM 
COAG is a product of the federal nature of Australia’s system of government, 
some say a necessary one.147  Its every action is shaped by the features of this 
system.  While it is far from the only forum in which the Commonwealth, States 
and Territories interact, it is the most visible.  COAG can be said to be 
emblematic of contemporary federal-state relations in Australia.  It follows, 
therefore, that criticisms currently made in the public arena of COAG tend also 
to be aimed at Australia’s federal system generally.   
Such criticism has come from many quarters over recent months, including:    
 In April 2013, Paul McClintock, former chair of the COAG Reform Council 
wrote that, while the IGA on Federal Financial Relations represented a 
“radical, progressive approach and is seen internationally as best practice”, in 
fact the model was undermined at an early stage.  He also expressed the 
opinion that “[w]e are without a coherent view of federalism, and health and 
education policies, housing and indigenous programs, even tax policy, make 
little sense if you have no idea how different levels of government will work 
together to deliver them”, and called for a policy on federalism from both 
major parties.  In a subsequent radio interview, McClintock elaborated on 
these matters, describing COAG as dysfunctional and noting, among other 
things, the absence of a public debate on the respective role of governments 
and the seemingly increasing trend of centralisation of money and power in 
Canberra.148 
 
 In a speech to the National Press Club in April 2013, the President of the 
Business Council of Australia, Tony Shepherd, said that COAG needed to be 
abolished.  According to the Australian Financial Review, Mr Shepherd said 
“COAG is not working and an imbalance in the financial relationship between 
federal and state governments needed to be addressed.”149  
 
 In April 2013, The Australian reported that the Queensland Premier, 
Campbell Newman, had described COAG as a “dysfunctional farce”, and had 
“criticised the overlapping roles of the commonwealth and states in 
education, health, workplace relations and the environment as inefficient, 
confusing and a waste of taxpayer money.”  The Australian reported that “Mr 
Newman said the commonwealth had gradually encroached into areas of 
state responsibility – set out by the Constitution – in the past few decades 
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and that it was time Canberra ‘retreated’ in the interests of good 
governance.”150 
 
 In February 2013, former NSW Premier Nick Greiner warned that COAG was 
“grossly overburdened” and said that “there needed to be fewer issues on the 
COAG agenda to achieve meaningful reform.”  In addition, Mr Greiner is 
quoted as stating that there were two interrelated problems with current 
arrangements in Australia, one relating to the need to improve the 
governance of the federal system, the other to the public finance crisis facing 
the states.151  
 
 The following day, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that another former 
NSW Premier, now Senator and Foreign Minister, Bob Carr had “called for an 
overhaul of state-federal relations, saying the states should be given more 
power and the Council of Australian Governments should be radically 
changed.”  Senator Carr was quoted as stating “Let’s get serious, let’s strip 
the COAG agenda right back”.152    
This paper is not the place to canvass the debate about federalism, which is 
vast, complex and perennial.153  As such, it does not attempt to discuss the 
various theories and modes of federalism, of which there is an “alphabet”154, nor 
does it seek to compare the Australian arrangements for intergovernmental 
relations to those of analogous federalisms.  Nevertheless, several features of 
Australian federalism are of crucial influence in shaping not only COAG as an 
institution, but also its reforms, the way in which these are delivered and also 
the power dynamics that find their expression within the forum: 
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 the financial arrangements – specifically the high degree of vertical fiscal 
imbalance; 
 
 the division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States; and 
 
 the lack of mechanism in the Australian Constitution (Constitution) to facilitate 
intergovernmental relations. 
a. Commonwealth/State financial relations and vertical fiscal imbalance 
One of the most prominent features in the landscape of Australia’s federation is 
the high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI).  By this it is meant that the 
Commonwealth collects more revenue than it needs for its own purposes, while 
the States, which have traditionally retained responsibility for some of the most 
expensive services, such as hospital care and school education, are not able to 
raise enough to deliver those services without financial assistance from the 
Commonwealth.   
It is enough to say here that the level of VFI in Australia is problematic for a 
multitude of reasons, many of which are set out by Twomey and Withers in 
Federalist Paper I: Australia’s Federal Future.  They include the reliance of the 
States upon property and transaction taxes, “which can be seen as taxes on 
mobility, activity and flexibility and are classified by economists as relatively 
inefficient taxes.”155  VFI also has consequences for accountability in 
government.  This is at least in part attributable to the fact that there are no 
clear lines, in the traditional sense, between the raising of revenue and its 
expenditure.156  Twomey and Withers state: 
Australia’s fiscal arrangements also mean that areas where there are major 
expenditure roles for both levels of government (such as health and education) 
are more common in Australia than in most other federal nations.157 
They go on to comment in relation to a table in their paper which shows 
national/state shares in health outlays across selected federations that:  
Australia stands out in the mix of responsibilities across levels of government, 
with all the concomitant problems of incentives for cost-shifting between 
jurisdictions and lack of transparency and accountability to the public – problems 
with which Australians are familiar.158 
Their reliance upon Commonwealth funding means that the States are more 
receptive to the Commonwealth’s interference in policy than they might 
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otherwise be.  As Galligan has observed: 
Money talks politically and buys policy influence.  In recent decades, 
Commonwealth dominance had racheted up several notches, with disregard for 
federal parameters becoming more brazen among Commonwealth leaders.159 
b. Division of powers 
The powers of the Commonwealth Parliament are delineated by the 
Constitution, predominantly by section 51.  The Constitution does not attempt to 
similarly specify the powers of the States.  The assumption was that, while the 
Commonwealth had only the powers ascribed to it by the Constitution, the State 
Parliaments would retain broad or plenary powers, subject to those limitations 
found in the Commonwealth Constitution.  Except where the Constitution 
provides otherwise, as in section 90 in relation to the power to impose customs 
and excise duties, the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament are not 
exclusive to it, but are held concurrently with the States.  Section 109 is an 
attempt to prevent the different levels of government from enacting laws which 
are in conflict.  It provides that where there are inconsistent Commonwealth and 
State laws, the law of the State is invalid to the extent that it is inconsistent with 
that of the Commonwealth.       
Notwithstanding the intentions of the framers160, power has become 
increasingly concentrated at the centre of the federation.  A number of 
influences on this trend can be identified, including: the High Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution in a series of decisions161; the financial 
superiority of the Commonwealth; the Commonwealth’s inventive use of all of its 
powers, including its executive power and its fiscal powers like section 96 of the 
Constitution; and changing perceptions regarding which issues are of “national 
concern” and which can be addressed locally.162  The Commonwealth is now 
involved in the development and regulation of policy that would have seemed 
beyond its sphere at the time of federation, for example in relation to tertiary 
and school education.  Indeed, it even seems as though there is now a public 
expectation that the Commonwealth will lead, or at least participate in, most 
important policy initiatives, whether they relate to one of its enumerated powers 
or not. 
One consequence viewed in the context of Australia’s constitutional framework, 
is that it can be difficult to discern precisely which level of government is 
responsible for what.  As one commentator colourfully put it, the division of 
power and responsibility between governments in Australia resembles 
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“scrambled eggs” rather than “a neatly layered cake.”163  This has flow-on 
consequences, not only for efficient service delivery, but also for fiscal and 
political accountability.    
c. Lack of a constitutional mechanism for intergovernmental relations 
The Constitution does not create a structure or mechanism to facilitate 
interaction and cooperation between the levels of government on matters of 
mutual responsibility or interest.      
The only provision in the Constitution that specifically contemplates the need for 
such arrangements is section 101, which allows for the establishment of an 
Inter-State Commission.  However, this body was not intended to have general 
jurisdiction over all aspects of interstate relations.  Rather, its scope was to be 
limited to powers deemed necessary by the Commonwealth Parliament for it to 
ensure the execution and maintenance of the provisions in the Constitution 
concerning interstate trade and commerce.  Such a Commission has been 
established by the Commonwealth Parliament on two occasions, but did not 
survive for very long on either, being first an early casualty of the High Court’s 
then fledgling separation of powers jurisprudence, and later, apparently 
succumbing to the political circumstances of the time.164     
In the time since Federation, the Commonwealth, States and Territories have 
developed their own mechanisms for interacting and working together.  This has 
been necessary due to the considerable number of concurrent powers they 
share, and also the multitude of social and other changes that have occurred 
since federation, which have necessitated cooperation in ways that could not 
have been foreseen at the time.  Martin Painter has explained: 
The essential character of the division of functions in the Australian constitution 
is concurrence, that is, most of the functions are shared rather than being 
exclusive.  But there are no constitutionalised mechanisms for pooling 
governments' law-making or executive authority to deal with these shared 
functions.  Practical exigencies in fulfilling constitutionally sanctioned functions 
bring governments together, but at the same time the Constitution sets them 
apart as distinct political entities.  This is one reason for rich complexity of 
administrative and political machinery of intergovernmental relations.165 
Geoff Gallop has made a similar observation: 
A dominant theme in Australia’s history is that intergovernmental cooperation is 
both necessary and desirable.  Cooperation is necessary because of the nature 
of the division of responsibilities under the Commonwealth Constitution and the 
evolution of the revenue arrangements and roles and responsibilities of the levels 
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of government since federation.  However, cooperation is also desirable because 
it has the potential to provide a mechanism for bringing to bear a sense of 
national purpose, and the expertise and experience of governments in service 
delivery.166 
Since there is no constitutional or other formal provision for a body or forum to 
facilitate intergovernmental relations, the void has been filled by governments in 
an ad hoc fashion.  This has enabled the evolution of a body such as COAG, 
which has been able to adapt to changing circumstances throughout its twenty 
year history.  However, it also means that COAG, its Councils and other 
associated entities such as the CRC, are creatures of the executive, which exist 
beyond the scope of the normal checks on power found in the system of 
representative government that Australia has, and are therefore in a kind of 
governance vacuum.  This of course gives rise to accountability questions.  It 
can also be argued that the absence of an institutional structure, based on a 
principled approach to intergovernmental collaboration has consequences for 
the balance of power between the Commonwealth and the States, in the sense 
that the Commonwealth is able to use its more powerful position to dominate 
COAG and ensure that its policy preferences prevail over those of the States.  
These issues are discussed in more detail below. 
10. COAG & THE PRACTICE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN 
AUSTRALIA 
In its 2011 report on its inquiry into Australia’s Federation, the Senate Select 
Committee said of COAG that: 
Since its creation in 1992, COAG has been the peak intergovernmental forum in 
Australia . . . Over the years a wide range of issues has been discussed at 
COAG, including events such as the Bali bombings and the global financial crisis.  
All of these discussions have highlighted the need for effective intergovernmental 
operations and they have strengthened the role of COAG.167  
The Committee further said that COAG had “been largely successful in 
promoting national cooperation amongst governments”, saying that one of its 
most notable successes was the implementation of the National Competition 
Policy.168  However, the Committee also noted that many of the submissions it 
had received referred to the need for reforms to be made to aspects of the 
COAG structure and practice.169  While the problems that have been identified 
with COAG and the practice of intergovernmental relations, both in the 
submissions to the Senate inquiry and by other observes are many, they mostly 
seem to fall within broad, closely interlinked, categories, which include: 
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 the lack of adequate governance, transparency and accountability measures, 
including a lack of scrutiny by parliaments in relation to intergovernmental 
processes; and 
 the imbalance created by the Commonwealth’s dominance of COAG. 
a. Lack of transparency  in intergovernmental relations 
In its 2011 report, the Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian 
Federation noted that there was “a need for greater transparency of COAG 
processes, particularly in areas such as the public availability of agendas prior 
to meetings and the publication of meeting schedules.”170  
In their 2011 article Kildea and Lynch say that: 
The challenge of understanding COAG is made difficult for expert and lay person 
alike due to its failure to be adequately transparent . . . Little effort is made to 
provide the public with detailed information about meeting outcomes or the 
reasoning behind them.  Nor are there any procedures in place to require 
governments to make available agreements or other documents for the scrutiny 
of Parliament.171 
As noted by Kildea in a later paper, the proceedings of COAG and its Councils 
“occur behind closed doors”.  He equates the communiqués of these bodies 
with “press releases”, noting that they contain “few details about meeting 
outcomes or the reason behind them.”172  For Kildea, this has consequences for 
the ability of citizens to participate in intergovernmental relations in Australia: 
In a very basic sense, the closed nature of intergovernmental relations impacts 
on participation by making it difficult for interested parties to obtain accurate and 
timely information about the issues under discussion.  As noted above, formal 
communiqués provide only a partial record of meetings, and rarely go into detail 
about the reasoning behind decisions that have been made.  Based on these 
documents it will not always be easy for groups or citizens to discern if there 
have been developments that may be of interest to them.  In some cases it can 
even prove difficult to maintain an awareness of which issues are the subject of 
discussion and negation in intergovernmental fora.  As is well known, COAG 
agendas are generally finalised only days in advance of the meeting and are no 
released publicly.  Media reports offer some guidance as to what will be 
discussed, but they generally focus only on the most politically contentious issues 
– such as health funding and hospitals reform . . . 173 
In addition to the opacity of communiqués, agendas or agenda papers are not 
generally made publically available.  While all intergovernmental agreements 
appear to be available on the website of the Standing Council on Federal 
Financial Relations, efforts to piece together current, up to date information 
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about a range of COAG-related matters can require what Kildea has described 
as “significant effort” and “intrepid research”.174 He notes that amendments to 
the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) have meant that documents relating 
to Commonwealth/State relations now fall within the “conditional exemption 
category”, which means that access to such documents must be provided on 
request, unless that is such access would “on balance be contrary to public 
interest”.175  Gaining access to information in this way would require a person to 
have sufficient understanding of COAG and its processes to be able to frame an 
application for the information, something which is hard for those outside the 
bureaucracy working on intergovernmental relations to either acquire or 
maintain.   
The “Protocols for Council of Australian Governments and Senior Officials 
Meetings” document, which is annexed to the 2011 report of the Senate Select 
Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation, provides further insight 
into why it might also be difficult to obtain COAG documents under access to 
information legislation.  Under the heading “Status of COAG and Senior 
Officials Documents” it states: 
Documents prepared for COAG and Senior Officials are COAG-in-confidence, 
unless otherwise agreed by COAG or Senior Officials.  Documents should be 
tightly held and only distributed on a strictly need to know basis. 
When there is an expectation that a document prepared for COAG or Senior 
Officials will be made public, all COAG members should be advised early in the 
preparation of the document.  If a COAG member received a request for a 
document to be made public (either through a Freedom of Information request, a 
Royal Commission or some other avenue), all members of COAG will be 
consulted regarding the release of the document.176 
This lack of transparency has consequences for the accountability of COAG’s 
processes, in addition to those that it has for the capacity of members of the 
community to become engaged and/or participate in the decision-making that 
takes place at COAG and at its Councils.177 
In its 2011 report, the Senate Select Committee recommended that “agendas 
for COAG meetings be . . . made publicly available before meetings.”178  It 
further recommended “that outcomes of COAG meetings be published in a 
more transparent manner than is currently the case with the communiqués.”179 
In its response to the Select Committee’s report, the Commonwealth 
Government stated: 
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The Government does not support making the COAG agenda publicly available 
before meetings.  The confidentiality of COAG proceedings promotes the open 
and frank exchange of ideas, and ultimately enhances the capacity of COAG 
members to reach agreement in addressing issues of strategic national 
importance.  Notwithstanding the Government’s position in this respect, it should 
be noted that COAG members can, and as a matter of course, do, publicly 
identify key items for discussion in advance of COAG meetings.180 
In relation to the publication of more transparent outcomes for COAG meetings, 
the response said that the recommendation was noted, but: 
The COAG communiqué represents high-level outcomes of COAG meetings, as 
agreed by all COAG members.  It is publicly released and published on the 
COAG website immediately following the conclusion of a COAG meeting.  
Intergovernmental agreements are published on the COAG website, and National 
Agreements, National Partnership Agreements and Implementation Plans are 
published on the Standing Council on Federal Financial Relations website.181 
O’Meara and Faithfull suggest what would seem to be a compromise between 
these two views, which attempts to address both the need for more 
transparency, and also sufficient confidentiality to ensure the “frank exchange” 
of views: 
That COAG Communiqués should better reflect progress achieved, agreement 
and disagreement (as appropriate) on all significant items, whilst allowing 
confidential discussion to remain as such.  This will strengthen accountability and 
transparency to the public.182 
b. Accountability – COAG, intergovernmental relations and Parliaments   
As discussed further below, COAG is not regulated by any formal structure.  
There is no provision for it in the Constitution, and no attempt has been made to 
formalise it in any way, for example by enacting legislation providing for its 
arrangements.  It therefore exists beyond the scope of parliamentary oversight 
in a way that other institutions of executive government arguably do not.  Even 
an executive institution such as Cabinet, which is generally not subject to 
statutory or other types of formal prescription, is accountable to Parliament 
through conventions of ministerial responsibility.  While, obviously, the individual 
members of COAG remain accountable to the Parliaments in their own 
jurisdictions, the lines are blurred in relation to the collective accountability of 
COAG itself.183   
Kildea and others have also noted that the “fusion of federal and parliamentary 
modes of government” in Australia has given “rise to a system of ‘executive 
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federalism’ in which “the executive branch designs the organisational context of 
intergovernmental relations and is the dominant actor.”184  Anderson has written 
that COAG has “entrenched executive federalism” in several ways, including “by 
providing a rationale for a much more powerful role of central agencies in policy 
development across all levels of government” and also by encouraging the 
growth of “new bureaucratic networks across State borders.”185  According to 
the Commonwealth Parliament’s Joint Committee of Public Account and Audit, 
in its Report 427 – Inquiry into National Funding Agreements, “unlike the 
exposure of other government policies to parliament through legislation”, 
agreements brokered in this sphere are subject to minimal “democratic 
accountability and parliamentary scrutiny.”186      
One way in which these accountability issues with COAG and other 
intergovernmental relations fora in Australia have been described is in terms of 
a “democratic deficit”.187  This concept is explored by Kildea in a paper 
published in 2012, “Making Room for Democracy in Intergovernmental 
Relations.”188  He identifies the elements of the deficit as being, in his view; 
 the lack of transparency in intergovernmental relations, not just at COAG, but 
also in relation to the “extensive negotiations involving senior officials and 
other bureaucratic actors” which occur prior to COAG and COAG Council 
meetings, all of which take place behind closed doors189;  
 the accountability problems associated not only with the marginalisation of 
Parliaments that tends to be the result of ‘executive federalism’, but also with 
the fact that, since the decisions made at COAG and in other forums are 
often collective “it can be difficult for citizens to know where to direct their 
blame or praise” for them, and potentially difficult for Oppositions to challenge 
governments regarding them, for instance where actions taken in an 
intergovernmental context have “been endorsed in another jurisdiction in 
which that same party holds government”190; and  
 the multiple barriers that the current practice of intergovernmental relations 
places in the way of participation by citizens in policy making, which include 
the “sidelining of Parliament”.191 
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Kildea argues that while “[t]he challenge of reconciling the practice and 
institutions of intergovernmental relations with basic democratic values has long 
been a matter of concern in Australia”, governments have done “very little” to 
address this matter.192  He also suggests that the new pattern in which COAG 
now operates, where it appears to function as almost the final decision-making 
body in relation to policy on a vast range of issues, combined with what he 
considers are higher “public expectations of democratic practice”, has given 
“increased urgency” to the need to subject COAG to some kind of accountability 
measures.193  One way in which Kildea suggests that the democratic deficit 
might be alleviated to some degree is the formalisation of “COAG’s status and 
operation.”194  The concept of the institutionalisation of COAG, and ways this 
might be done, is outlined further below. 
Kildea also analyses several ways in which the role of Parliament might be 
reinstated in the process. For example, he suggests that participants in COAG 
or its Councils should be required to report back to their respective Parliaments 
regarding what transpired at each COAG or Council meeting, and to table 
agendas, minutes and other relevant documents.  He considers that the 
obligations that apply to Ministers in the ACT in relation to the tabling of 
intergovernmental agreements should apply to Ministers in other jurisdictions.195   
Ministers in the ACT were subject to requirements regarding the reporting of 
their intergovernmental activities to the Legislative Assembly from 1997.  Initially 
these requirements were contained in the Administration (Interstate 
Agreements) Act 1997.  However, this was repealed in 2005 and a set of 
administrative measures were put in place which required Ministers to table 
intergovernmental agreements in the Assembly as soon as practicable after 
they were signed, and the Chief Minister’s agency to “compile and maintain a 
list of current negotiations towards intergovernmental agreements that it is 
anticipated ministers will sign.”  A current version of this list was to be tabled in 
the Assembly every six months.196  As of 2013, however, tabling of agreements 
and information about them will not continue in the ACT.  Instead, they will be 
publicised on the website of the ACT’s Chief Minister and Treasury 
Directorate.197 
Kildea then turns to a consideration of ways in which parliamentary committees 
might be able to provide some oversight of intergovernmental agreements.  For 
example, he writes “[i]deally, parliamentary committees in each jurisdiction 
(Commonwealth and state) should review and report on laws giving effect to 
intergovernmental agreements.”198  As possible models, he cites approaches 
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taken in Western Australia, and previously in Queensland, which he says at 
least allow Parliaments to fulfil “an ‘after the fact’ scrutiny role”, as possible 
models.199  
In Western Australia, the Legislative Council has a Standing Committee on 
Uniform Legislation and Statutes Review.  The Standing Orders of the 
Legislative Council provide that Bills seeking to give effect to either an 
intergovernmental agreement or a scheme of uniform laws can be referred to 
the Standing Committee either at the conclusion of the second reading speech 
of the member in charge, or following an order of the Council.200  Standing 
Orders in place since March 2012 state that the Committee “must now confine 
both its inquiry and report on a Bill to an investigation as to whether the Bill may 
impact upon the sovereignty and law-making powers of the Parliament of 
Western Australia.”201   
The Parliament of Queensland Act 2001 (Qld) formerly contained a provision 
which provided that “the area of responsibility about legal reform” of the then 
Law Justice and Safety Committee included “proposed national scheme 
legislation referred to the committee by the Assembly” (section 87(a)).  This 
provision was repealed in 2011 when the committee system of the Queensland 
Parliament was reformed.  However, Bills which implement national schemes 
may be still be considered by the relevant portfolio committee as part of the 
normal course of the oversight role played by these committees in 
Queensland’s unicameral Parliament.  When reviewing Bills, portfolio 
committees are required to consider “the application of fundamental legislative 
principles to the legislation.”202  These fundamental legislative principles are set 
out in the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld).  One such principle is whether 
the Bill “has sufficient regard to the institution of Parliament”203  For an example 
of a committee’s consideration of a Bill implementing a national scheme in 
relation to this principle, see the Agriculture, Resources and Environment 
Committee’s report on the Electronic Conveyancing National Law (Queensland) 
Bill 2012.204 
Kildea also explores the idea of engaging Parliament more fully by having all 
intergovernmental agreements, not just those that require legislation, reviewed 
by a committee after they are signed.  He notes that this has previously been 
recommended by the former House of Representatives Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, but the proposal was rejected by the Commonwealth 
Government as it would encroach upon the capacity for governments to be 
flexible in their relations with each other.  He notes that the flexibility issue is a 
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valid one, acknowledging that it “would be problematic, for instance, if first 
ministers negotiated an agreement at COAG, only to have one or more 
parliamentary committees subsequently recommending the amendment of key 
terms” and also that there “is a clear tension here between democratic 
principles and considerations of flexibility and accountability.”205  In his view, the 
accountability benefits of allowing committees to scrutinise agreements after 
they had been entered into would outweigh any obstacles to flexibility this may 
present.206   
Kildea goes on to examine the “even more ambitious reform” of implementing a 
practice in which intergovernmental agreements are considered by 
parliamentary committees while they are still in draft form.207  As Kildea notes, 
in its 2011 report, the Senate Select Committee on the Reform of Australia’s 
Federation recommended the establishment of a Joint Standing Committee of 
federal Parliament with a role of overseeing matters connected to the 
federation, including COAG.208  The Select Committee recommended that this 
new Committee should consider and review all proposed intergovernmental 
agreements, and also any legislation that was proposed as the basis of a 
referral of power to the Commonwealth by a State or States.209  In the event, 
the Commonwealth Government did not agree that intergovernmental 
agreements required the scrutiny of such a committee: 
Intergovernmental agreements between the Commonwealth and state and 
territory governments are agreements between executive governments, often 
entered into by First Ministers.  There already exist a number of mechanisms 
available to the Parliament to consider and review intergovernmental 
agreements, including through the consideration by the Senate’s legislation 
committees of estimates of proposed annual expenditure by government 
departments and authorities.  A further formal referral process to the proposed 
Joint Standing Committee, should it be established, is not needed for the 
Parliament to exercise its review function.210 
Once again, Kildea acknowledges the limitations of the proposal for Committee 
scrutiny of intergovernmental agreements, including that “it is arguable that the 
introduction of this strong-form scrutiny across all jurisdictions would undermine 
the practical operation of intergovernmental relations.”211  He recognises that 
requiring Ministers to wait until parliamentary committees had undertaken full 
scrutiny of agreements before they were finalised could bring the 
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intergovernmental relations process to a halt.212  He concludes that, while 
allowing committees to scrutinise agreements before they were signed “would 
strengthen parliamentary accountability” it is “doubtful that the democratic 
benefits of this type of parliamentary scrutiny would outweigh the potential 
damage to the workability of intergovernmental relations.”213 
For Jennifer Menzies, such difficulties with the parliamentary process help to 
explain why governments resort to executive federalism, which she writes has 
“served Australia well, particularly since the mid-1980s.” 214   Menzies adds: 
Political leaders intuitively understand that our system of executive federalism 
works for our political and economic culture and the enormous transaction costs 
which would accrue through changing this model to increase Parliament’s role.  
As related earlier, Australian politicians are responsive to the need to be 
pragmatic and problem solving.  They also understand there is a disconnect 
between the reality of the modern decision-making and Parliamentary processes.  
For example, the House of Representatives sits between 50 and 70 days a year.  
This sitting schedule, which is a left-over from the horse and buggy days, cannot 
produce timely outcomes to have a meaningful input to a global crisis.   
As well, Parliaments are adversarial and divisive while executive federalism, at its 
best, is problem solving and consensual.  Parliamentary scrutiny is about taking 
time, deferring decisions, local grandstanding, stalling and above all, 
embarrassing the government of the day.  In today’s globalised economy, the 
opportunity costs for reducing our reliance on executive federalism and 
increasing the role of Parliamentary scrutiny remain too high for political leaders 
to seriously contemplate.215 
Menzies accepts the need for improved accountability and considers that reform 
of executive federalism to achieve this must be “two-pronged – to improve the 
structures and the operation of intergovernmental decision-making and to 
reform Parliament to allow it to take a meaningful role in scrutinising decisions 
and agreements.”216  She suggests a further way for Parliaments to be involved 
in the process, appointment of a Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs at the 
Commonwealth level.  Menzies says that this would “give an ongoing point of 
scrutiny within the Parliament” as: 
The Minister could table and debate new agreements, answer questions and 
appear before Parliamentary scrutiny committees.  With the increasing reliance 
on intergovernmental agreements, a Minister would raise the profile of this work 
within the Parliament and the community.  A Minister for Intergovernmental 
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Relations would also remove some of the pressure from the Prime Minister and 
the limited attention he or she is able to give to these issues.217   
The need to somehow bring intergovernmental relations within the scope of 
Parliaments in Australia has been identified elsewhere.  In Report 427 – Inquiry 
into National Funding Agreements, the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and 
Audit noted the way in which funding agreements are negotiated through COAG 
“at an executive-to-executive level”, and that while this allowed agreements to 
be reached more swiftly, “it can be at the expense of transparency.”218  The 
Committee considered that: 
Transparency and accountability considerations within the new intergovernmental 
arrangements and wider COAG system are directly linked to the issue of 
parliamentary scrutiny.219   
The Joint Committee said that it had received several submissions from State 
governments, including that of NSW, which expressed a seemingly shared view 
that current levels of parliamentary scrutiny of funding under the IGA on Federal 
Financial Relations were sufficient.220  However, the Committee further noted 
that some academics that provided submissions to the Inquiry were “not as 
content with or supportive of the current level of Commonwealth Parliamentary 
scrutiny.”  A key area of concern, for these submitters, was the “power of the 
Executive to negotiate and develop national funding agreements.”221  For 
example, the Committee summarised the submission made by the Gilbert + 
Tobin Centre of Public Law at the University of New South Wales as follows: 
The Centre of Public Law explained that funding agreements will not be subject 
to parliamentary scrutiny if they do not require legislative implementation and that 
even when this is needed the impact of parliamentary scrutiny is limited because 
the details of the agreement are presented ‘as a fait accompli’. 
As mentioned earlier, the Centre of Public Law described the sidelining of 
parliaments in this process as a ‘democratic deficit’.  The executive’s 
accountability to the legislature is weak, therefore, reducing the practice of 
‘responsible government’ a cornerstone of Australia’s Westminster system.  
Further, valuable input from a variety of perspectives may not be capitalised and 
potential for improvements may be absent from the process.222 
The Joint Committee expressed the view that “more can be done to facilitate 
parliamentary scrutiny of national funding agreements, in particular at the 
implementation stages.”  Such scrutiny, it was argued, “will help ensure value 
for money is achieved for Australian taxpayers, and that a clearer picture of the 
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success or otherwise of the national finding agreements is obtained.”223  The 
Joint Committee’s report contained the following recommendations: 
Recommendation 12  
The Committee recommends that signed National Partnerships are tabled in 
Parliament, along with a complementary Ministerial Statement.  
Recommendation 13  
The Committee recommends that the Prime Minister deliver an annual Statement 
to the House:  
 outlining the Commonwealth Government’s perspective on the contribution of 
national funding agreements to the improvement of the well-being of all 
Australians; and  
 summarising the number of current, new, upcoming and expired National 
Agreements and National Partnerships. 
The Committee also recommended that COAG Reform Council reports should 
be tabled in Parliament one month after they are submitted to COAG, and also 
that relevant Productivity Commission reports be tabled as soon as practical 
(recommendation 11).  In its response to this recommendation, the 
Commonwealth Government stated: 
The CRC releases publicly its NA performance and NP assessment reports, and 
Productivity Commission reports are already tabled in Parliament within 25 sitting 
days of being received by the Treasurer.  However, in some instances neither the 
CRC nor COAG release certain reports.  This occurs, for example, when the 
contents are commercial-in-confidence.  Consequently, COAG reserves the right 
to withhold certain reports if there is a compelling reason to do so.224                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The Commonwealth Government also indicated in its response that it did not 
agree with recommendation 12, as all “agreements under the [IGA on Federal 
Financial Relations] are available publicly on the website of the Standing 
Council on Federal Financial Relations.”225  In relation to recommendation 13, 
the Government said it considered that “the recommendation’s objective is 
delivered through other existing avenues."226  
c. Commonwealth’s dominance of COAG 
Commentators have observed that the Commonwealth tends to dominate 
COAG’s operation in certain ways.  For example, O’Meara and Faithfull note: 
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Despite the fact that first ministers come to COAG as equal partners in the 
federation, the operation of COAG (and VFI) gives the Prime Minister more 
power in practice.  The Prime Minister is both Chair and the bank, which affects 
participants’ behaviour and engagement.  In addition, the Prime Minister 
determines the frequency and timing of COAG meetings, and sets the agenda, 
after seeking the views of other first ministers.  The COAG Secretariat is funded 
by the Commonwealth and is a business unit of the Prime Minister’s Department.  
Agenda papers are primarily authored by the Commonwealth, and are often 
circulated later than advised.  These time constraints only for allow minimal 
feedback from states and territories, which is not always incorporated.  The 
flipside of this is that states seldom attempt to take the lead on drafting COAG 
agenda papers and too often allow the Commonwealth to determine the agenda.  
Such operational practices give the Prime Minister a significant tactical 
advantage in the COAG arena.  Moreover, they can, on occasion, undermine 
good decision-making by first ministers.227 
Kildea and Lynch, too, note that “the Commonwealth controls key aspects of the 
operation of COAG”, including the agenda and matters such as the “frequency 
and timing of meetings.”  They note that “COAG’s role in intergovernmental 
decision-making depends largely on the Commonwealth’s commitment to it”, 
and that some Prime Ministers have staged COAG meetings less frequently 
than others.  They add that: 
The Commonwealth’s control of the timing of meetings is also significant, 
because this allows the Commonwealth to consult the States at a time that suits 
its own policy timetable, irrespective of the interests of the States.  One recent 
example was the Rudd government’s decision to give the States little more than 
a month to consider complex health and hospital reforms before being asked to 
give a firm commitment at COAG.228    
They add that the Prime Minister’s relative control of the items on the COAG 
agenda means in practice that: 
. . .  COAG meetings invariably address issues of interest to the national 
government.  While this is perhaps inevitable, given COAG’s focus on policy of 
national rather than local concern, and the Commonwealth’s ‘unique legitimacy’ 
in invoking the national interest in pressing particular matters, it is surely 
regrettable that sometimes the Commonwealth will only finalise the COAG 
agenda just days before the meeting, thus giving the States minimal time to 
prepare.229 
Shortly prior to the election of his Government in 2011, the NSW Premier Barry 
O’Farrell commented on the Commonwealth’s dominance of COAG, including 
its control of when and how often it met, and also its control of the agenda.  In 
terms of how these issues might be addressed, he stated “the Commonwealth 
should either commit to regular meetings, or provide the right for a majority of 
States to convene a meeting”; Mr O’Farrell was also of the view that “States and 
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Territories should play a role in [COAG’s] direction with a majority of States 
being able to add agenda items.”230 
Similarly, O’Meara and Faithfull say that: 
That the setting of COAG’s agenda should be genuinely opened up to the states 
and territories and not simply a matter for the Prime Minister’s consideration.  The 
production of agenda papers in a timely manner should be common practice, 
rather than an aspiration, in order to support good decision-making.231 
They further consider that: 
An independent secretariat (funded equally by all member jurisdictions) would 
ensure that COAG had strategic resources to fully engage all its members, to 
overcome many of the process and governance imbalances [identified by the 
authors in their paper] and to act more fully in the best interests of the nation.232 
Kildea and Lynch also note that the fact that the Prime Minister’s chairs all 
meetings of COAG, and the location of the COAG Secretariat in the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet are issues that may require some thought in the 
context of the Commonwealth’s dominance of COAG.233 
In its 2011 report, the Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian 
Federation made the following comments in relation to the matter of the COAG 
Secretariat: 
An equally important reform is the need to locate the administration of COAG on 
a more independent foundation, placing it at arm’s length from the 
Commonwealth Government.  This is currently the case with staffing of the 
COAG Reform Council, which is ‘located in Sydney and jointly funded by the 
Commonwealth and States and Territories.’ 
Australia’s federation would operate more successfully if most states and 
territories could develop and coordinate their policy positions on a range of 
issues independently of the Commonwealth.  Currently, the institutional 
architecture necessary to facilitate this objective is almost non-existent.234 
The Committee noted that “some capacity” for this kind of coordination amongst 
the States already exists in the form of CAF.  It considered that “the interests of 
closer federal state cooperation would be served if the states and territories 
were to meet more regularly through a more institutionalised CAF process”, and 
it therefore recommended that the States and Territories “establish a stronger 
foundation for [CAF] by providing additional funding, formalising Council 
processes and ensuring that it meets more regularly than is currently the 
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case.”235  
The Senate Select Committee also recommended that “agendas for COAG 
meetings be developed jointly by Commonwealth and State and Territory 
Governments . . . and that the timing, chairing and hosting of COAG meetings 
be similarly shared."236  However, in its response to this recommendation, the 
Commonwealth Government stated: 
The Government does not support changing the current chairing arrangements 
for COAG meetings.  The Prime Minister of the day has served as the Chair of 
COAG since its inception in 1992.  The arrangement remains appropriate, given 
the leadership Australian expect the Prime Minister to the Federation.  The 
current arrangement also reflects the fact that the Commonwealth is uniquely 
placed in the Federation to provide strategic direction and oversight on issues 
requiring inter-jurisdictional cooperation.237 
d. Lack of institutional structures and systems  
As noted, there is no reference in the Australian Constitution to a body such as 
COAG, nor is COAG governed by a statute or other type of formal regulation.238  
COAG is entirely a creature of executive government, both at Commonwealth 
and State level.  COAG and other apparatus for intergovernmental relations in 
Australia have been developed in an ad hoc manner, in response to the 
changing needs of governments over time.239   
Given the role COAG now seems to have assumed within the government of 
the nation, it has been observed that it requires a more formal structure to be 
not only more accountable, but also better equipped to deliver its reform 
agenda.  The basis of many of these observations seems to be that while 
COAG was simply a leaders’ forum that met occasionally to discuss a more 
limited range of national reforms, these problems of accountability and 
structure, while still present, were not so pronounced.  It is argued that, if COAG 
is going to continue in its current form, it needs procedures and a structure to 
both regulate and fortify it, and also to redress the apparent power imbalance 
between the Commonwealth and States which manifests in its processes.    
These themes can be identified in the text of a speech given by Paul McClintock 
to the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia in February 2011, 
in which he said that the “role of COAG has changed profoundly over the past 
two decades”, transforming from an occasional leaders summit to what he 
considered to be one of “the two most important executive governance 
structures we have in Australian national public life” (the other being the federal 
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Cabinet).240  He spoke of the adoption of the IGA on Federal Financial Relations 
and said: 
The scope of the COAG reform agenda that emerged from this period is 
remarkable, headed up by the six National Agreements covering health, 
education, skills, disability, housing and indigenous affairs.  Under those six 
National Agreements were placed some complex and detailed National 
Partnerships, the most important of which relates to the Seamless National 
Economy . . .  Other topics were added, including important agreements relating 
to water, and capital cities infrastructure.  The oversight of all this is now the task 
of COAG – in addition to its ongoing role of looking at new policy challenges (like 
health) and managing the day to day business of the federation (like floods). 
. . . COAG has turned itself from an occasional summit meeting to a key 
governance institution, but the implications of this change now need to be 
understood and addressed.241 
At a later point in his address he added that while “COAG is run appropriately 
for its old role of an occasional summit meeting”, if it was “to continue to 
oversee the breadth of the COAG reform agenda” it was necessary “to look at 
its effectiveness as a governance structure.”  He went on to note: 
The summit meeting model logically had no set timetable as the Commonwealth 
did not call a meeting unless it had something to solve.  It was also logical that 
the Commonwealth set the agenda, and that no permanent resources were 
needed.  It is, however, less clear to me that the governance model required by 
today’s COAG reform agenda has the same logic. 242 
Others have made similar observations.243  In his 2012 paper, Kildea wrote: 
COAG is currently in the incongruous situation of exerting the power of a central 
institution of executive government, while possessing the governance structures 
of a mere meeting of leaders.  This may have been suitable in its early years, but, 
especially since the initiation of the reform agenda, it is no longer appropriate.244    
The need for a more formal, institutional structure for COAG was also 
recognised by the Senate Select Committee on the Reform of Australia’s 
Federation.  In its 2011 report, it stated that: 
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. . . several reforms and improvements can be made to COAG and the Ministerial 
Councils which would enhance its efficiency, encourage greater transparency 
and strengthen COAG’s institutional standing.  These improvements would focus 
on three areas: agenda setting, accountability and administration. 
State governments should have an equal stake with the Commonwealth in 
COAG.  This could begin with a formal, transparent intergovernmental agreement 
to underpin COAG.  For some years now, stakeholders, including the Business 
Council of Australia, have been arguing for a stronger institutional structure for 
COAG.245 
Recommendation 5 of the Committee’s report was that: 
The committee recommends that COAG be strengthened through 
institutionalisation to ensure the Council’s effective continuing operation and 
ability to promote improved mechanisms for managing federal state relations.  
The principles of transparency and joint ownership should be central to this 
institutionalisation.246 
It should be noted that, in its response to the Select Committee’s report, the 
Commonwealth Government indicated that it did not agree with this 
recommendation: 
COAG’s organisational arrangements and operations should maintain the 
strategic capacity of First Ministers, in particular to respond in a flexible and 
timely manner to current and emerging issues at the intersection of jurisdictional 
responsibilities. 
Chairing COAG and bringing leadership to the Federation is an inherent aspect 
of the Prime Minister’s role.  The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
(PM&C) supports the Prime Minister in this role.  The location of the COAG 
Secretariat in PM&C enhances the capacity of the Secretariat to provide strategic 
support to COAG, and to ensure the timely and successful preparation of agenda 
papers and other materials for COAG meetings.247  
At least four potential ways that arrangements for COAG could be formalised 
have been suggested: 
1. the negotiation of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) setting out 
requirements for the governance of COAG; 
 
2. establishing a complementary legislative regime for COAG; 
 
3. entrenching COAG in the Constitution; and 
 
4. including reference in the Constitution to cooperative federalism. 
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It would be possible to design any of these options in a way that attempted to 
address the issues that have been highlighted above regarding transparency, 
accountability and balance.   
Each of these options has advantages and disadvantages, which are explored 
by Kildea and Lynch in their 2011 article, “Entrenching ‘Cooperative 
Federalism’: Is it Time to Formalise COAG’s Place in the Australian Federation”.  
In relation to the possibility of resolving some of the issues with COAG by 
implementing an IGA, they consider that while (as the Select Committee also 
appeared to acknowledge), this might be a place to begin the formalisation of 
COAG’s processes, such an approach would have certain limitations, including 
that “COAG’s legal status would remain tenuous” and “governance 
arrangements and reporting requirements could be ignored with little or no legal 
consequence.”248  They also note that an IGA “could not deliver the strong 
democratic legitimacy that comes with constitutional entrenchment.”249   
In relation to legislating for COAG, Kildea and Lynch say that this could be 
achieved if all jurisdictions passed complementary legislation which gave 
“recognition to the existence and role of COAG.”250  They argue that such 
legislation could address a range of matters, including: 
Membership, decision rules, frequency of meetings and agenda processes could 
all be detailed in legislation, as could reporting requirements designed improve 
accountability and transparency.251 
Kildea and Lynch say that while such legislation might constrain the flexibility of 
COAG “to a degree”, its effects would not be as severe as they might be if 
provision were made for COAG in the Constitution.  They also note that while 
the “democratic legitimacy” conferred on COAG by a legislative approach would 
not equate to that of an alteration to the Constitution, which would have to be 
approved by the people, the arrangements would nonetheless be subject to 
parliamentary approval.  Legislation for COAG would also give it “a solid legal 
basis”.  Kildea and Lynch note that the statutory recognition option “presents 
itself as a feasible middle-ground: less risky and far more feasible than 
entrenchment, but more muscular than recognition by less formal means.”252  
They further note that there would most likely be some difficulties associated 
with the implementation of legislation for COAG, including “the achievement of 
consensus across all nine jurisdictions with respect to any proposed 
complementary scheme” and also the need to accomplish “some attitudinal or 
cultural change to support the more collaborative model of COAG envisaged by 
the suggested reforms.”  They conclude such challenges “would not necessarily 
be insurmountable.”253       
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Kildea and Lynch also consider ways in which the Constitution could be 
amended to make some provision for intergovernmental relations.  For 
example, they say this could be done by inserting provisions in the Constitution 
which either simply recognise “the existence of COAG as an institution of 
federal governance” or, in addition to recognising COAG, also making some 
specifications regarding “its core governance arrangements.”254  In their view, 
making some form of provision for COAG in the Constitution in this way would 
have a number of advantages, including the removal of the uncertainty 
surrounding its status, ensuring that “it would no longer be vulnerable to 
dissolution, but would instead exist as a permanent fixture of governance within 
the Australian federation.”255  Other benefits would flow from the referendum 
process itself, including an increased level of public understanding regarding 
the “position, purpose and decisions” of COAG, and also the conferral upon 
COAG of “a popular legitimacy that it presently lacks.”  They state that: 
Its existence would be seen to originate not in the agreement of first ministers, 
but rather in the exercise of popular sovereignty, thus enhancing COAG’s 
democratic credentials considerably.256     
Some of the potential drawbacks of this approach, also considered by Kildea 
and Lynch, include that “it would potentially undermine the flexibility and 
responsiveness” that currently characterises COAG, and which has “enabled it 
to evolve in the manner that it has” and possibly render it “less able to respond 
to changing circumstances.”257  A further risk they identify is that “it would 
increase the power of the executive with uncertain effects”, and note that: 
Without the incorporation of specific procedures enabling parliamentary 
oversight, there would be potential for constitutional recognition of COAG to 
enhance the already considerable position of the executive in Australia’s system 
of government.258      
An alternative constitutional alteration would be to include reference to the 
concept of cooperative federalism in the Constitution.  This could include either 
a narrower, more technical change to the Constitution, or a broader, principles-
based change to the Constitution, or a combination of the two.259  The narrower 
category of change would simply make amendments to specific provisions of 
the Constitution designed to overcome the difficulties in relation to cross-vesting 
and the sharing of executive power which have arisen from certain decisions of 
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the High Court.260  The broader category would include some provision in the 
Constitution to “support intergovernmental cooperation.”261  Twomey suggests a 
number of ways this might be done, for example by “inserting in any new or 
revised preamble a statement recognising the importance of cooperative 
federalism, so it would no longer be dismissed as a mere political slogan”, or by 
including a provision, similar to section 105A, which would “permit the making of 
agreements between the Commonwealth and the states concerning matters 
within their legislative, executive and judicial powers.”262  Kildea and Lynch 
consider that reforms along lines such as these would assist and further 
legitimise the work of COAG, despite the fact that they “would not, in 
themselves, give COAG a more permanent legal status, reduce centralism or 
improve democratic accountability.”263  They indicate that constitutional 
amendments of this kind would “usefully supplement” the kind of statutory 
regime for COAG outlined above.264  
On a practical note, it must be remembered that attempts to change the 
Constitution formally in the past have met with limited success.  Any proposals 
requiring the amendment of the Constitution must therefore be considered in 
this light.  
e. COAG & the consequences of co-operative schemes 
COAG’s new significance as an institution for policy-making is made possible by 
a heavy emphasis on intergovernmental cooperation, which, as noted, usually 
takes the shape of an intergovernmental agreement of some kind.  The scope 
of these agreements has, over time “become more pervasive and their design 
more complex.”265 While it is desirable in some senses, this increased level of 
intergovernmental cooperation has some broad-ranging consequences.  Not 
least among these is the further centralisation of power.     
Anderson has observed that COAG has become a means of facilitating what he 
describes as “cooperative centralism”: 
. . . COAG, which began as a means for encouraging cooperative federalism, in 
fact ha[s] become a vehicle for what might be described as ‘cooperative 
centralism’.  The momentum towards cooperative centralism was the result of the 
COAG process John Howard: the process was significantly more cooperative 
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under Kevin Rudd, however, there is little indication that the trend towards 
centralism will diminish.266 
In his 2012 paper, the current Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, 
Robert French, raised the question of “whether the trend to a variety of 
cooperative arrangements is driving Australia into a singular state: a federation 
in constitutional form, but a unitary state in political reality.”267  He went on to 
note:  
The development of ‘cooperative federalism’ in Australia has been significant.  
There is an array of schemes in place, or contemplated, for overcoming the 
difficulties to which the division of legislative and financial powers gives rise in 
areas seen as requiring a national response.  But that development does not 
seem to be informed by principles for determining which matters are best dealt 
with by a cooperative or multi-government approach and which are not.  Nor are 
there in evidence principles for selecting the most appropriate cooperative 
mechanism. The identification and application of such principles is not 
straightforward.  A conservative selection principle would favour a scheme which, 
while achieving desired efficiencies has the least impact on the distribution of 
federal power.  On the other hand, the conservative principle may give rise to 
complexity.  A principle of simplification and the location of accountability in one 
authority may be preferred.268  
After detailing the history of intergovernmental cooperation on certain policy 
areas over time, Chief Justice French makes the following remarks about the 
centralising trend he has identified: 
Cooperative federalism today is in part extra-constitutional.  Driven by political 
imperatives, it yields results on a consensual basis, which go well beyond those 
achievable by the exercise of Commonwealth legislative power and the separate 
exercise by the states of those powers.  In that sense, the cooperative federalism 
movement may be seen to overshadow expansive interpretations of 
Commonwealth power under the Constitution.  And, in my opinion, although 
cooperative and thus respecting the formal constitutional position of the states, it 
contributes towards centralisation.  For every topic which is treated as national 
becomes, potentially, a matter which, somewhere along the line, can be argued 
is best dealt with by national government. 
Mixed jurisdictional cooperative schemes may appear to be fragile because they 
depend upon a consensus.  But once in place, it is arguable, there is a ratchet 
effect.  Once a topic has been designated as one of national significance, 
requiring a cooperative approach, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which 
it becomes politically acceptable to the parties to go backwards and fragment 
responsibility for it.  The pressure seems to be in one direction only.269     
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As discussed in relation to the IGA on Federal Financial Relations, Chief Justice 
French refers to the accountability issues that arise in connection with 
cooperative schemes.  He suggests that the referral of powers by the States to 
the Commonwealth is one mechanism for intergovernmental cooperation in 
which legislative arrangements are simpler and lines of accountability are 
clearer.270  However, notes that, “in the application of this power, as in other 
areas of cooperative federalism, it would be desirable to have some kind of 
coherent and principled framework” to guide decisions about the use of the 
reference power, which might cover the type of reference to make in certain 
circumstances and perhaps include a classification of “the range of safeguards 
available to protect state interests, and therefore federalist principles where a 
reference is made”.271  He also cautions: 
Most people prefer to see cooperation between the components of a federation 
rather than conflict.  But when the trend of cooperation is ultimately to centralise 
power, then the price of cooperation may ultimately involve a risk of losing some 
of the benefits of federation.272 
Saunders has also written about the capacity of this increased degree of 
cooperation to fundamentally alter the shape of Australia’s federal system, and 
of the need for a more principled approach to be taken to it.  She argues that 
intergovernmental cooperation in Australia has progressed “to a point that is 
beginning to alter the de facto, although not the de jure, design of the Australian 
federation.”273  In her view, the continued expansion of cooperation: 
. . . has consequences for a range of key constitutional principles: accountability 
and transparency; the relationship between governments and parliaments; the 
rule of law; and of course, federalism itself.274         
For Saunders, what is in fact emerging at the moment is “a new form of 
governance”, which not only affects these principles, but which has “institutions 
and practices [which] tend to be opaque.”275  Saunders notes “[t]here is 
advantage in now beginning to consider the framework of principle within which 
intergovernmental arrangements should operate.”276  After considering some 
comparable federations, she says: 
. . . there should be a more formal, public and principled institutional framework 
for the ministerial council network, including COAG, that systemises the 
relationship between councils; provides guidance on design questions, including 
on voting rules; distinguishes between quasi-legislative and executive action; 
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acknowledges and tackles the problem of political and legal accountability; and 
gives council activities an administrative support base that is not dependent upon 
one sphere of government.277 
11. CONCLUSION  
In their 2011 article, Kildea and Lynch wrote: 
In essence, COAG is a response to the federal system established by the 
Constitution as it now operates in a modern, integrated society in an increasingly 
globalised world at the start of the 21st century.  The consequence of this view is 
that COAG, despite its tenuous status as a major mechanism of governance, is 
not an ephemeron.  It, or something very much like it, will surely be a part of the 
landscape of Australian federalism from here on.  Just as Voltaire said of God: if 
COAG did not exist, we would have to invent it.278 
Their assessment that COAG, or something close to it, is now a permanent 
feature of Australian federalism would seem to be incontestable, even if only 
from a purely pragmatic perspective.  While this much appears to be settled, a 
range of questions remain.  Some of these questions are specific to COAG and 
the practice of intergovernmental relations, for instance those relating to how it 
can be made more transparent and accountable, in keeping with our 
expectations about institutions of democratic government.  Others are broader 
and relate to Australian federalism itself; what it is, what it does, what it should 
do and where it is going. 
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